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Abstract
Despite the prevalence of business entertainment in economic life, nearly all studies on the
phenomenon have explored it from a social perspective by labeling it as a social vice. Although a
few scholarly works have identified the role of business entertainment in facilitating exchange
relationships; none of them has offered a systematic explanation of how business entertainment
plays such a role. Meanwhile, despite some scholars’ recognition of the role of social sanctions
in regulating economic activities, virtually none of them has explored the relationship between
social sanctions and business entertainment. This dissertation aims to bridge these gaps by
arguing that business entertainment plays a governance role by reinforcing social sanctions to
regulate economic transactions.
Drawing on theories from the literatures on economics, business management, anthropology,
sociology, and psychology, I start with the proposition that each society during its evolution
forms a transaction governance structure (TGS) featuring a unique combination of market, social,
and legal sanctions in regulating economic relationships. Depending on their social and cultural
heritages, some societies rely more on social sanctions, and others more on legal sanctions, to
compensate for the failure of market sanctions. I further argue that underdeveloped market and
legal infrastructures are associated with prevalent practice of business entertainment because the
latter plays a role in reinforcing social sanctions that supplement market sanctions. These
arguments set up a theoretical framework for systematically explaining the social practice of
entertainment in business settings from a perspective of economic transaction governance.
To verify the above arguments, I derived two sets of hypotheses and conducted two empirical
tests within the Chinese context: one to predict the pervasiveness of business entertainment at the
firm level, using secondary data collected from firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in
China; the other to test the effectiveness of business entertainment at the transaction level, with
primary survey data collected from a sample of Chinese corporate client sales managers.
Statistical results from both tests provide support for my transaction governance approach to
business entertainment.
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Societies in their evolution have developed implicit agreements to certain
kinds of regard for others, agreements which are essential to the survival of
the society or at least contribute greatly to the efficiency of its working.
— Arrow, 1974: 26
…(In) all economic systems known to us up to the end of feudalism in
Western Europe,…the orderly production and distribution of goods was
secured through a great variety of individual motives disciplined by general
principles of behavior. Among these motives gain was not prominent.
Custom and law, magic and religion co-operated in inducing the individual
to comply with rules of behavior which, eventually, ensured his functioning
in the economic system.
— Polanyi, 2001:57
In societies which have no ‘self-regulating market’ (in Karl Polanyi’s sense),
no educational system, no juridical apparatus, and no State, relations of
domination can be set up and maintained only at the cost of strategies which
must be endlessly renewed, because the conditions required for a mediated
lasting appropriation of other agents’ labor, services, or homage have not
been brought together.
— Bourdieu, 1977: 183
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Chapter 1
1. Introduction
1.1. The Phenomenon
Business entertainment, defined as entertainment activities in business settings, such as eating at
restaurants, drinking at bars and teahouses, golfing, singing at Karaoke clubs, traveling,
sightseeing, and watching ball games with business partners, has been a popular practice among
managers worldwide.
Business entertainment is particularly rampant in China, where most business transactions are
carried out with the facilitation of entertainment activities (see Zhang, 2001). Data from the 2007
annual reports of more than 220 companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange indicate that
these companies on average spent 10 percent or more of their annual profits (1.17 million yuan
on average, ranging from 325,000 yuan to 617 million yuan) on business entertainment. In the
public sector, which mainly consists of the state-owned enterprises (SOE), the official statistics
show that in 2004 alone, entertainment expenses exceeded 360 billion yuan, which is more than
twice the total expenditures (170 billion yuan) on building the Three Gorges Dam (Outlook
Weekly, 2006). These figures indicate the pervasiveness of business entertainment in China.
Business entertainment, nonetheless, is not a phenomenon limited to China. In the United States,
for instance, business entertainment was once so pervasive between the medical profession and
the pharmaceutical industry that, in April 2003, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services issued a compliance guide to curb such practices
(The New York Times, 2003; Dresser, 2006).
In Australia and Canada, business entertainment is the most frequently practiced activity in
conducting commercial transactions (Armstrong, 1992; Chan & Armstrong, 1999). In Greece,
likewise, lavish and extravagant entertainment is considered a necessary “custom” in business
transactions (Kavali, Tzokas & Saren, 2001). In Japan, managers are often engaged in afterhours entertainment activities at nightclubs with their business partners at the company’s expense
(Allison, 1994; Alston, 1989). Organizations like the International Olympic Committee (IOC),
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whose most famous motto is “fair play,” were also rocked with allegations of largesse and
munificence. During the voting process to choose the next site for holding the Olympic Games,
according to Booth (1999), it is a widespread practice that the bidding cities arrange extravagant
travel and sightseeing programs for IOC officials and their families at resorts.

1.2. Previous Research
Scholars have not left the phenomenon of business entertainment unexamined. Rather, numerous
studies have addressed the issue. In the Chinese context, for instance, a unique stream of
literature on guanxi has developed to give an extensive treatment on business entertainment (i.e.,
in the context of social networks and connections built through business entertainment, see Yang
[1994] for details about the “art of guanxi”; also see Gold, Guthrie & Wank [2002] for a review).
Based on their arguments for the good or bad nature of business entertainment-related guanxi
practices, these studies can be roughly classified into two camps. The proponents of guanxi
practices argue that social connections built through business entertainment can substitute for
formal institutional support (Xin & Pearce, 1996), create organizational dynamics (Park & Luo,
2001), reduce transaction costs (Standifird & Marshall, 2000), sustain competitive advantages
(Tsang, 1998), and therefore lead to efficiency and business success (Davies, Leung, Luk &
Wong, 1995; Lovett, Simmons & Kali, 1999; Yeung & Tung, 1996). The opponents claim that,
on the contrary, business entertainment in guanxi practices triggers ethical problems (Fan,
2002a), causes corruption (Manion, 1996; Steidlmeier, 1999), and will “harm the weak Chinese
corporate governance system and hamper its further economic development and growth”
(Braendle, Gasser & Noll, 2005).
Previous studies on business entertainment in the general management literature follow a similar
dichotomist approach, focusing mainly on the good or bad nature of the practice and often
putting a negative label on it. Based on the criterion that bribes are bad but gifts are good,
virtually all studies on business entertainment are polarized at either the bribe or the gift end,
addressing ethics-vs.-efficiency issues with either a normative or an instrumental approach.
Those business entertainment practices that are perceived as bad are labeled as bribes—the
synonym of corruption—or at least are treated as being ethically problematic (e.g., Cooper,
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Frank & Kemp, 1997; Fritzsche, 2005; Kitson & Campbell, 1996; Mellahi & Wood, 2003;
Turner, Taylor & Hartley, 1994). The literature explores, in a normative manner, what the nature
and consequences of these practices are (e.g., Pacini, Swingen & Rogers, 2002), what motivates
managers to entertain or “bribe” others (Powpaka, 2002), why those practices are bad (e.g.,
D’Andrade, 1985), and how to combat them (e.g., Gordon & Miyake, 2001).
On the other hand, when certain business entertainment practices are perceived as good, they are
then treated as gifts. With an instrumental approach, the literature focuses on how effective gifts
work as marketing wares (e.g., Beltramini, 1992, 2002; Bruhn, 1996; Dorsch & Kelley, 1994;
D’Souza, 2003), or how they can improve productivity (e.g., Flynn, 2003) and strengthen
affective organizational commitment (e.g., Grant, Dutton & Rosso, 2008).
Both the pro and con camps of studies have made valuable contributions to our understanding of
the roles played by business entertainment in our society. Nonetheless, there are still major gaps
in the literature, which hinder the field from generating better explanations for the phenomenon.
Despite the prevalence of business entertainment in economic life, virtually no previous study
has given it a systematic explanation from an economic perspective. Instead, nearly all studies
have made their analyses from a social perspective (e.g., Beck & Maher, 1986; Beltramini, 1992;
Dorsch & Kelley, 1994; Flynn, 2003; Fritzsche, 2005; Grant et al., 2008; Mellahi & Wood,
2003). Meanwhile, although some neo-classical economists and economic sociologists have
acknowledged the role of social sanctions in governing economic transactions (e.g., Arrow,
1974, Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Granovetter, 1985), few studies have further investigated the
positive role that such business practices as entertainment play in reinforcing social sanctions to
facilitate economic transactions. These literature gaps pose three questions on the business
entertainment phenomenon, which I specify below.

1) If business entertainment is truly corruptive, why is it widely practiced at the
population level in some societies? Business entertainment involves both a giver and a
taker (e.g., the seller and the buyer in a business deal). Whereas the motive of the
business entertainment giver is obvious (e.g., to secure a contract), the taker’s willingness
to be “corrupted” in private settings has remained unexplained. For instance, when
business entertainment is perceived as bribery, economists identified the major factors
4

that influence the willingness of giving and taking as the probability of being convicted,
the severity of punishment, and the relative salary levels of givers and takers (Goel &
Rich, 1989). In private business settings, however, we often find that even when we
might assume, based on these determinants, that an individual will not take business
entertainment, he or she takes it anyway. This puzzle remains unsolved.
2) Why is business entertainment widely adopted in some societies but limited in others?
The pervasiveness of business entertainment varies substantially from society to society.
Treating business entertainment either as bribes (e.g., Martin, Cullen, Johnson &
Parboteeah, 2007; Sanyal, 2005) or as gifts (e.g., Arunthanes, Tansuhaj & Lemak, 1994),
prior studies have used cultural, economic, human, and other factors to investigate the
variations in the popularity of business entertainment across countries. The empirical
results have been mixed, however. For example, the cultural factor of collectivism vs.
individualism in these studies generated different or even opposite results (e.g., Davis &
Ruhe, 2003; Sanyal & Samanta, 2004a). The question of why business entertainment is
pervasive in some societies but limited in others is still waiting for a systematic
theoretical account.
3) If business entertainment indeed plays a positive role in economic life, what are the
mechanisms that underlie such a role? The aforementioned guanxi studies have
identified a number of positive functions which business entertainment serves in
economic life (e.g., Park & Luo, 2001; Xin & Pearce, 1996). When it is perceived as a
gift, business entertainment is also regarded as a powerful marketing tool (e.g.,
Beltramini, 1992, 2002; Bruhn, 1996; Dorsch & Kelley, 1994). When it is labelled
bribery, business entertainment has been found to be a common alternative to competitive
bidding (Beck & Maher, 1986) and an efficient auction mechanism (Leff, 1979).
However, these studies did not provide a systematic explanation as to how business
entertainment plays such a role. The mechanisms underlying the positive roles of
business entertainment in economic activities remain unexplored (see Luo, 1997).
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1.3. Research Objective
Against the background described above, the objective in this dissertation is to bridge the
literature gaps, address the above unanswered questions, and thereby advance our understanding
of business entertainment. This objective will be accomplished by setting up a theoretical
framework upon which business entertainment plays an economic transactions governance role
through a social behavioral process.
To pursue that end, I begin by delineating the boundaries of this study. First, this study focuses
only on the secular components of social sanctions, without exploring the role of religious social
sanctions, religion being one of the principal social institutions regulating human behavior (see
Iannaccone [1998] for an introduction). Second, instead of debating the good or bad nature of
business entertainment, this study aims to identify the function of this social practice. Third,
rather than taking the perspective of either the giver or the taker, this study treats business
entertainment as an integrated, interactive process of giving and taking (Hodgson, 1992)
embedded in social relations (Zelizer, 1998). Fourth, instead of assuming that there is a clear way
to distinguish bribes from gifts, the study sees business entertainment as a general construct,
based on the understanding that defining a business entertainment practice as either bribe or gift
is relevant to cultural and other contexts (e.g., Salbu, 1997; Noonan, 1986; Philips, 1984).
Finally, without limiting the takers of business entertainment to public officials, the study covers
all economic transactors in business settings, including private agents (e.g., Dunfee, Smith, &
Ross, 1999), principals (Fort & Noone, 2000), and any ordinary persons (Smart, 1993).
Within the above boundaries, I provide an explanation for business entertainment from the
perspective of economic transaction governance. Drawing on economics theories on transaction
governance, I begin my conceptualization by proposing that each society coordinates economic
activities by developing a transaction governance structure (TGS) featuring a unique
combination of market, social, and legal sanctions in regulating the behavior of economic agents.
Depending on its cultural and historical heritages, a society may rely more on social sanctions,
while others may depend more on legal sanctions, and still others equally on social and legal
sanctions, to supplement market sanctions in regulating exchange relationships. I call this pattern
the relativity of TGS across societies.
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Based on insights from theories in anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, I further
argue that business entertainment serves as a significant amplifier of social sanctions in
regulating the behavior of economic agents, especially in societies where market and legal
infrastructures are underdeveloped. This approach maps social theories onto the literature of
economic transaction governance and sets up a theoretical framework that enables a systematic
explanation for the social practice of business entertainment from a perspective of economic
transaction governance.
The above theoretical framework allows me to carry out empirical tests in a more accurate and
proper way than has been done in previous studies. First, to predict why business entertainment
is more pervasive in some cases than in others, I draw hypotheses that use society-level
characteristics to predict business entertainment expenses at the firm level. Second, to address
the issue of why business entertainment is more effective in some situations than in others in
facilitating business transactions, I also develop hypotheses that use the social behavioral
features of business entertainment to predict its effectiveness in smoothing transactional
relationships.
To the best of my knowledge, this dissertation is the first study that offers a systematic
explanation for the practice of business entertainment from a transaction governance perspective.
It draws on theories from multiple disciplines to trace the social and behavioral origins of the
business entertainment phenomenon and to find the underlying reasons for its resilience and
pervasiveness. The study bridges the gaps between anthropology, economics, management,
sociology, and social psychology to offer a better understanding of a widely practiced and
commonly observed but understudied and often misunderstood phenomenon. More specifically,
my dissertation treats the business entertainment practice as an interactive social behavioral
process that is embedded in human relations and that represents an inseparable part of the
transaction governance structure with which a society as a whole coordinates economic
interactions. My empirical method is also the first to operationalize and test the social practice of
business entertainment with both economic and perceptual data at multiple levels. The study is
meaningful to both policy makers and practitioners in business, as well as to academic
researchers in multiple fields.
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1.4. Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is composed of six chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2
provides a general literature background on business entertainment, economic transaction
governance, and social sanctions. Literatures under review cover research on business
entertainment in the context of business ethics, marketing, international business, and business
guanxi studies, economics studies on transaction governance, and sociological studies on social
sanctions. At the end, a research agenda is outlined against this general literature background.

In Chapter 3, I present the model of transaction governance structure (TGS), which consists of
market, social, and legal sanctions, and propose the relativity of TGS across societies. I also
elaborate on how business entertainment enhances the power of social sanctions to regulate
economic transactions. I focus on business entertainment’s role in promoting reciprocal behavior
at the individual level, establishing and maintaining long-term relationships in dyadic
interactions, and enhancing group dynamics within communal settings, all of which are
conducive to effective working of social sanctions, effective regulation of individual behavior,
and, hence, effective governance of transactions.
In Chapter 4, I use China as an empirical context to develop a set of hypotheses to explore how
society-specific characteristics shape different TGS and affect business entertainment spending
at the firm level. These hypotheses are tested on secondary data collected from annual reports of
manufacturing firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE).
Chapter 5 again uses China as a context to test why business entertainment is more effective in
some situations than in others at the transaction level. I develop a theory to build a link between
business entertainment’s effectiveness and its social behavioral features. These arguments are
tested on a set of survey data collected from client sales managers working for a sample of
companies affiliated with a business association in China.
I conclude the dissertation with Chapter 6, summarizing its major contributions to the literature;
presenting its implications to policy makers and business practitioners; and acknowledging its
limitations, which also point out promising directions for future academic research.
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Chapter 2
2. Literature Background
This section first reviews the literatures on business entertainment in the context of business
ethics, marketing, and international business. Following that, the economics literature on
transaction governance and sociological literature on social sanctions are surveyed. These
seemingly disparate literatures are then summarized and synthesized to introduce a new agenda
that aims to offer a transaction governance account for business entertainment.

2.1. The Current Literature on Business Entertainment
2.1.1. Business entertainment in the general management literature
The management literature in general covers the business entertainment phenomenon in the
context of business ethics, marketing, and international business. Business ethics studies often
focus on the nature of the phenomenon (good or bad); the marketing literature emphasizes
business entertainment’s positive role in facilitating business transactions; and the international
business research analyzes the business entertainment phenomenon from a cross-cultural
perspective. Overall, these studies can be classified into two opposing camps on which I will
elaborate below.

2.1.1.1. The negative view: Business entertainment perceived as a social vice
Management studies that take a negative view of business entertainment often use a normative
approach to focus on business entertainment’s ethics issues, social effects, and pervasiveness
relative to different cultural, institutional, and organizational contexts. Such studies perceive
business entertainment either as bribery, which is often a synonym for corruption, or at the least,
ethically problematic practices. Empirical tests on the factors that lead to the pervasiveness of
business entertainment across societies have produced mixed results.

9

2.1.1.1.1. Business entertainment as bribery and ethically problematic practices

Generally, the studies that perceive business entertainment as a bad practice often explore what
the nature and consequences of business entertainment practices are (e.g., Pacini et al., 2002),
what motivates managers to entertain others (Powpaka, 2002), why such practices are bad (e.g.,
D’Andrade, 1985), and how to combat business entertainment (e.g., Gordon & Miyake, 2001).
Some studies have also recommend best-practice prescriptions to cope with business
entertainment (e.g., Doh, Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins & Eden, 2003; Johnson, 1985;
Weismann, 2008).
The fundamental argument in this body of literature is that business entertainment practices
should be labeled as bribery or at least as ethically problematic or undesirable activities (e.g.,
Baumhart, 1961; Brenner & Molander, 1977; Lewis, 1985; Tsalikis & Fritzsche, 1989). More
specifically, for instance, in Gordon and Miyake’s (2001) survey on 246 corporate codes of
conduct, the majority of these standards clearly categorize entertainment activities as bribes. In
another study, Fisher (2007) identified the major unethical practices in business settings as
offering clients drinks, meals, entertainment, and tickets to sporting or cultural events. To
maintain consistency with the original terminology in prior studies, I will sometimes call
business entertainment activities “bribery” or “unethical business practices” when I review these
studies.
When business entertainment is perceived as bribery, it often refers to transactions within which
the giver offers something of value in exchange for a benefit conferred through abuse of the
taker’s job duty (Mauro, 1995; Nichols, 1999; Rasmusen & Ramseyer, 1994). In many studies,
bribery is usually considered synonymous and interchangeable with the term corruption and
condemned as an evil in economic life (D’Andrade, 1985; Getz & Volkema, 2001; Treisman,
2000). For example, Nichols (1999) labeled business entertainment and related activities as a
corrupt practice and argued that such activities could corrode governments, distort economies,
undermine democratic institutions, and degrade transnational relationships.
Regarding the relationship between the nature and the intensity of business entertainment
practices, most studies believe that no matter how small the scale of such practices, they are
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nonetheless intolerable. For instance, Argandona (2005) argued that even if disguised as small
facilitating favors, business entertainment practices still have a pernicious effect on the working
of public and private organizations because most of the time they serve as the slippery slope to
more serious forms of corruption.
In the Chinese context, some of the studies of guanxi (i.e., the social networks and connections
built through business entertainment) hold negative views on the business entertainment
phenomenon. They claim that business entertainment in guanxi practices leads to ethical
problems that are not conducive to economic development (see Fan, 2002b; Millington,
Eberhardt & Wilkinson, 2005). They believe that such practices are the major causes of
corruption in China (see Dunfee & Warren, 2001; Manion, 1996; Steidlmeier, 1999).
Viewing business entertainment through negative lenses, international business scholars have a
broad coverage on business entertainment. They try to establish certain types of relationships
between the pervasiveness of the perceived bad practice of business entertainment and cultural,
economic, and other factors across societies. Regarding cultural influence on this practice, most
studies used either the cultural dimensions index (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede & Bond, 1988) or
the Project GLOBE’s cultural measures (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004;
House, Javidan, Hanges & Dorfman, 2002) in their models to test correlations between cultural
factors and business entertainment activities. Nevertheless, none of these studies has developed a
theory that can systematically explain the business entertainment phenomenon across societies.

2.1.1.1.2. Empirical evidence

Those scholars doing empirical research on business entertainment who perceived the practice as
bribery have found that factors at both the firm level and the individual level affect the
pervasiveness of those practices (e.g., Hamra, 2000; Powpaka, 2002; Sanyal, 2005). Empirical
studies at the firm level have produced mixed results regarding firms’ use of business
entertainment or bribery in their daily operations. In a survey among 3,769 firms, Martin et al.
(2007) found that firm-level factors such as financial constraints and intensity of competition
have a major impact on a firm’s business entertainment and bribery activities. In a different study,
it was found that a firm’s ethics policy and human resources practices are major factors affecting
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such practices within a firm (Hamra, 2000).

Like the studies at the firm level, empirical research on the motives for receiving entertainment
or taking bribes at the individual level have produced mixed results too. Here the different results
regarding individual motives for bribe-taking were mainly due to different research emphasis.
For example, with a research focus on economic factors and formal external sanctions, Goel and
Rich (1989) found that the major factors influencing bribe-taking are the probability of being
convicted, the severity of punishment, and the giver’s and taker’s relative salary levels.
Elsewhere, with research emphasis focused on cognitive and behavioral factors, Powpaka’s
(2002) survey among 188 Thai business managers found that these individuals’ willingness to
take a bribe was affected by attitude towards bribes-taking, subjective norms, and necessity of
the bribe.

Empirical studies in international business have produced mixed results as well. For example,
when business entertainment is perceived as bribery, Martin et al.’s (2007) study found that the
cultural characteristic of collectivism has a significant negative relationship with the prevalence
of business entertainment or bribery practices. Similar research by Davis and Ruhe (2003),
however, produced the opposite results. Elsewhere, Sanyal (2005) and Getz and Volkema (2001)
tested the determinants of business entertainment or bribery practices in international business
and found that the collectivism factor was not significant. The only consistent result produced by
many studies is that the economic factor has a significant negative relationship with bribery
activities, that is, the more developed a society is, the less prevalent business entertainment or
bribery is within it (e.g., Husted, 1999; Martin et al., 2007; Sanyal & Samanta, 2004a, 2004b).

2.1.1.1.3. Comments
The negative studies on business entertainment built their arguments on the premise that business
entertainment is bad and equivalent to bribery, which in turn is often considered to be the
synonym of corruption (e.g., Brademas & Heimann, 1998; Davis & Ruhe, 2003; Getz, 2006).
Corruption, in fact, refers to a larger scope of misconducts beyond bribery, including kickbacks,
embezzlement, cronyism, nepotism, favoritism, fraud, and political corruption (e.g., Khatri,
Tsang & Begley, 2006; Oldenburg, 1987). Some have questioned the use of Transparency
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International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to measure the pervasiveness of bribery or
business entertainment across nations (Lambsdorff, 1998). Furthermore, virtually all of the
studies limit business entertainment takers to public officials, focusing on entertainment
activities between business and government. Few of them explore business entertainment at a
business-to-business level (Dunfee et al., 1999; Fort & Noone, 2000; Lambsdorff, 1998).
In addition, the negative studies often limit business entertainment takers to public officials,
focusing on business entertainment between business and government only, without really
looking into such relationships between businesses, or other parties. In real business settings,
however, business entertainment takers include private agents (e.g., Dunfee et al., 1999;
Lambsdorff, 1998) and principals (Fort & Noone, 2000), or any ordinary person (Smart, 1993).
Sometimes, it is hard to tell who is a public official, who is a private agent, or who is a principal
in business settings. For example, in emerging markets where business entertainment is more
prevalent, the same business entertainment taker can be both a corporate executive at a stateowned enterprise and a governmental official holding a public position (McCubbins, 2001). In
transitional economies that are in the process of privatization, a business entertainment taker can
also have the dual status of being a governmental official and a private entrepreneur (Salbu,
1997).
Another drawback of this stream of study is that the researchers try to distinguish between bribes
and gifts by overlooking the fact that defining business entertainment as either bribes or gifts is
context specific. A bribe in one circumstance might be a gift in another , and it is very hard to
apply a general principle to all situations (Oldenburg, 1987; Noonan, 1986; Pitman & Sanford,
2006). Furthermore, as bribe is a legal term and the law stipulates what constitutes a bribe
(Noonan, 1984; Rose-Ackerman, 1998), different legislatures may have different legislations
about what is a bribe (Nadler & Schulman, 2008), and different firms may have different codes
of conducts defining what practices are permitted and what are unacceptable and unethical
(Kaikati & Label, 1980; Online Ethics Center, 2009). In addition, at the individual level, one
man’s medicine is another’s poison; one man’s gift is another’s bribe (Carvey, 1986; Weismann,
2008). It is problematic to treat business entertainment in all situations alike and to use a single
standard to define them as either bribe or gift.
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The international business scholarly publications suffer from the same pitfall of attempting to
isolate each business entertainment activity and label those activities as either bribes or gifts,
which is particularly hard to do in an international context, where culture plays a key role in
evaluating the nature of a business entertainment transaction (Duncan, 2000; Fatehi, 2008; Getz
& Volkema, 2001). Literally, the terms gift and bribe were used in an interchangeable manner in
the ancient Jewish bible (Berlin, Brettler & Fishbane, 2004: 1474–1479). As human society
evolved, however, a difference emerged between the two, in that a gift is now perceived as being
good and a bribe as bad (Husted, 1999; Kim & Kim, 1997; Krever, 2007). Yet, the judgment on
being good or bad involves moral standards that depend on the ethics and moral relativism across
cultures. Therefore, a bribe in one culture might be a gift in another culture (Moran & Harris,
2007; Philips, 1984; Salbu, 1997). It is questionable to lump together business entertainment
activities in all societies to evaluate their nature with a single standard without taking into
account the relativism of ethics and moral standards across different cultures.
The negative mark on business entertainment also affects empirical results in the testing of its
pervasiveness. The previous studies’ labeling of business entertainment as being corruptive and
unethical makes it difficult to collect reliable data, as few people are willing to reveal their
“corrupt” or “unethical” records in detail. In addition, all of these studies are based on isolated
factors, such as collectivism or intensity of competition, without applying a systematic approach
under a unified theoretical framework. As such, it is predictable that previous empirical studies
would not find consistent results, neither at the organizational level nor at the individual level.
Given their limitations, the negative studies on business entertainment have left an intriguing
question that continues to puzzle us: if business entertainment is truly corruptive, why is the
taker willing to be corrupted? In addition, business entertainment involves both a giver and a
taker (e.g., the seller and buyer in a business deal), but whereas the motive of the business
entertainment giver is obvious (e.g., to secure a contract), the taker’s willingness to be “corrupted”
remains unexplained. Furthermore, if business entertainment is truly corruptive, why is it widely
practiced at the population level in some societies?
2.1.1.2. The positive view on business entertainment
Contrary to those negative studies that label business entertainment as a social vice, a few
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management studies, particularly in the marketing literature, have assigned a positive role to
business entertainment, applying an instrumental approach to examine its effectiveness as a
marketing tool. In the Chinese context, some of the guanxi studies also view entertainmentrelated practices in business settings as a substitute for formal institutions. Still other studies
even recommended the best practices for delivering business entertainment to facilitate sales
more effectively.
2.1.1.2.1. Business entertainment as gifts and a marketing ware
The positive studies perceive business entertainment as a normal business practice and treat its
activities as gifts and favors that can facilitate marketing and sales (e.g., Fan, 2006; Bruhn, 1996).
For example, Dorsch and Kelley (1994) defined entertainment activities in a business setting,
such as drinking and eating, attending sports or entertainment events, an evening out on the town,
or hunting and fishing trips, as gifts. Again, to be consistent with the original terminologies in
former studies, I define business entertainment on some occasions as “gifts” in the review of this
literature stream.
When business entertainment activities are perceived as gifts, they are considered an effective
means of facilitating marketing and sales. Beltramini (2002) argued that organizations could use
business entertainment and gift-giving along with other marketing and communications
programs to retain existing clients and pitch potential clients. D’Souza (2003) identified a similar
positive role for entertainment and gift-giving practices in business contexts, arguing that such
activities have the benefits of building ties, cultivating relationships, enthusing loyalty and
goodwill, and serving as an integral part of relationship marketing. Elsewhere, Fan (2002a)
posited that business entertainment and gifts can help to reinforce other elements in a firm’s
marketing communications mix such as advertising and sales promotion.
Some of the studies in the marketing literature also focus on how to deliver entertainment and
gifts effectively to get better results. For example, Bruhn (1996) identified the factors that should
be taken into consideration when delivering business entertainment and gifts. These factors
include the type of business relationship, the recipient’s personal attributes, the objective or
purpose of the giving itself, the occasion of giving, the type of entertainment or gift, the need for
special types of entertainment or gifts, and the form of handling or presentation of the
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entertainment or gifts. Similarly, Fan (2006) suggested that the delivery of business
entertainment or gift should incorporate factors like the purpose, budget, timing, types, and
ethical considerations. Also, Greaves (2001) observed that to better promote business with a
message of quality, lasting appreciation, and perceivable value delivered through entertainment
activities and business gifts, such activities and gifts had to suit the age, gender, and lifestyle of
the intended recipient.
Even when business entertainment is perceived as a bribe, Beck and Maher (1986) still found a
positive role for it to play. They argued that entertainment-related practices in business settings
are a common alternative to competitive bidding on the purchasing side of the transaction, in that
the buyers are indifferent between bidding institutions (sellers) because the net purchase price is
the same. Leff (1979) made a similar argument comparing similar practices with auction
mechanisms in sales and marketing.
Again, in the Chinese context, some guanxi studies believe that entertainment-related guanxi
practices can help firms to achieve efficiency and business success (e.g., Davies et al., 1995;
Lovett et al., 1999; Yeung & Tung, 1996). With an instrumental approach, these studies propose
that business entertainment in a guanxi context is not a moral issue (Su & Littlefield, 2001; Su,
Sirgy & Littlefield, 2003; Tian, 2008); instead, it plays a key role in economic life by serving a
surrogate market system due to ill-defined property rights, economic roles, and a restricted flow
of information (Johnston, 1997). Based on their arguments and empirical results, social
connections arising from entertainment-related guanxi practices can substitute for formal
institutional support (Xin & Pearce, 1996), create organizational dynamics (Park & Luo, 2001),
and provide a complement to contract law (Luo, 2002; Potter, 2002). More specific to business
operations, some studies have also found entertainment-related guanxi practices to be able to
help establish business networks (Hammond & Glenn, 2004), reduce transaction costs
(Standifird & Marshall, 2000; Yi & Ellis, 2000), and sustain competitive advantage (Carlisle &
Flynn, 2005; Tsang, 1998).
In a cross-cultural context, when business entertainment is regarded as gift-giving, Kumayama’s
(1990) study emphasized the important role of business entertainment and gift-giving in Japanese
business life, while D’Souza (2003) suggested that business entertainment and gift-giving are an
integral part of business culture in Asia. Arunthanes et al. (1994) even did a cross-cultural
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analysis on business entertainment and gift-giving, arguing that business entertainment and giftgiving are more prevalent in high context cultures than in low context ones.
2.1.1.2.2. Empirical evidence
Most positive studies on business entertainment and gift-giving explored the effectiveness issue
empirically from the giver’s side, examining how similar practices initiated by the seller would
affect the buyer’s decision-making process (Wazana, 2000). Nevertheless, the results on the
effectiveness of business entertainment as a marketing ware are mixed. In addition, similar to
other studies in the marketing literature, empirical studies on the positive role of business
entertainment have failed to offer any theoretical explanations to support their findings (e.g.,
Burton, 2005; Deshpande, 1983).
For, example, Beltramini (1992) found that although business entertainment and gift-giving are
generally effective in increasing positive customer perceptions toward key product attitudes, they
are somewhat less so in increasing the buyer’s reported likelihood of actually contracting the
seller (i.e., the entertainment or gift giver). Furthermore, such activities are more effective in
facilitating sales when combined with other marketing communications tools. In a follow-up
study, Beltramini (2000) added more variables into her above-mentioned (Beltramini, 1992) tests
and found that more expensive business entertainment and gifts are relatively more effective in
generating an immediate and sustained increase in customer overall satisfaction and therefore
have greater potential to raise their intent to repurchase. In a different study, Dorsch and Kelley
(1994) found similar results. Despite these findings, no theoretical explanation has been offered
by any of those studies.
Contrary to the above findings, however, some other scholars found that gift value does not
really matter: both small and big gifts serve the same purpose and have the same effect (e.g.,
Friedman & Friedman, 1996; Katz, Caplan & Merz, 2003; Trawick, Swan & Rink, 1989). Like
the others, these studies did not build any theory.
Among the studies of business guanxi in China, a number of empirical papers have produced
results that support the argument that entertainment-related guanxi practices can create
institutional support for firms and are beneficial to asset efficiency and overall firm performance.
For instance, in Xin and Pearce’s (1996) study, they found that private entrepreneurs in China
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rely on more entertainment-related guanxi practices in doing business than their state-owned
rivals do, suggesting that business entertainment is an important alternative for formal
institutional support. Elsewhere, Park and Luo (2001) found that Chinese firms practice business
entertainment as a strategic mechanism to overcome competitive and resource disadvantages by
cultivating relationships and exchanging favors with business partners and regulators.

2.1.2. Summary: Limitations of the current literature on business entertainment
In general, there are three limitations that have affected the perceptions on business
entertainment and blurred relevant empirical measures, and, therefore, led to contradictory
theoretical arguments and mixed empirical results.
First, it remains unclear whether business entertainment plays a constructive or destructive role
in economic life. Within the extant literature, most of the analyses on business entertainment are
from a social perspective, labeling it as bribery or corruption, with a few of them exploring the
efficacy issue of business entertainment by treating it as gift-giving. According to the common
moral principles followed by former studies, bribes are bad, gifts are good; “bad” entertainment
activities are bribes that are corruptive and could cause ethical (or even criminal) consequences,
and “good” entertainment practices are gift-giving that could facilitate market transactions.
Building on these two conflicting views, two branches of study have developed: one examines
business entertainment’s nature and pervasiveness across countries, addressing the ethics issue
(i.e., perceiving business entertainment as bribery); the other explores business entertainment’s
effectiveness as a marketing ware in business settings, tackling the efficiency issue (i.e.,
perceiving business entertainment practices as gifts). An integrated approach is therefore needed
to accommodate the two perspectives.
Second, regardless of its positive or negative views on business entertainment, the previous
literature lacks a systematic theoretical framework for explaining business entertainment
practices as a social phenomenon in business settings. Particularly, business entertainment is a
prevalent phenomenon in economic life and, while some studies have recognized its role in
facilitating economic transactions, surprisingly, no study has applied an economic transaction
governance approach to explain this phenomenon. The foremost shortcoming of the positive
studies on business entertainment is that they have not applied a systematic approach to analyze
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the positive role that business entertainment plays in economic life; rather, they have simply
based their analyses on some factors that are not backed up by a strong theory. Consequently,
although they emphasize business entertainment’s constructive role in marketing and sales, and
even in enhancing firm performance, the question of how such a constructive role is carried out
still remains unanswered. In international business studies, due to the lack of an integrated
theoretical framework that might be used to reach an explanation of business entertainment that
could accommodate different situations across all cultures, nearly all studies use only isolated
factors, for example, “Protestant tradition, histories of British rule, higher imports, or federal
states” (Treisman, 2000), or simply plug some cultural factors into their models (e.g., Sanyal,
2005) to test their correlations with business entertainment. Consequently, these studies fail to
offer us a systematic explanation of why business entertainment is pervasive in some societies
but limited in others.
Finally, the lack of a systematic theoretical model has also caused the previous literature to fall
short in empirically interpreting the functions and underlying mechanisms of business
entertainment practices with an integrated approach. In addition, in the absence of a proper
definition and operationalization of the business entertainment phenomenon, the previous studies
also lack the proper empirical data necessary for systematic research. For example, in testing the
variations of the pervasiveness of business entertainment in different situations, previous studies’
labeling of business entertainment practices as being corruptive and unethical makes it difficult
to collect hard data, as understandably few people are willing to admit and report their corrupt or
unethical records in details. Consequently, previous studies have drawn their conclusions either
by borrowing data from similar concepts (e.g., data on corruption in economics; see Brademas &
Heimann, 1998; Davis & Ruhe, 2003) or from subjectively reported data based on individual
perceptions (e.g., Park & Luo, 2001; Xin & Pearce, 1996). In the empirical tests on the
effectiveness of business entertainment, virtually no study has been conducted from the business
entertainment giver’s side to verify its effectiveness as a facilitator in transactional relationships.
Most former studies have also tended to treat business entertainment practices in all transactions
alike without exploring what makes business entertainment in one transaction more (or less)
effective than in another.
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2.2. Economics literature on transaction governance
Transaction governance has been a prominent issue in economic life (see Alchian & Demsetz,
1972; Greif, 2000; Matthews, 1986). Orthodox economists believed that economic activities
could be perfectly governed by the “invisible hand” of market forces (see Smith, 1981). Neoclassical economists recognized the imperfections of the market and acknowledged that
additional governance schemes, e.g., legal arrangements, are required to govern the behaviors of
economic agents (see Arrow, 1974; Barzel, 1982; Spence, 1976). Building upon these thoughts,
the traditional transaction cost economics (TCE) theory framed transaction governance
mechanisms along the market-contract-hierarchy continuum, arguing that market failure can be
remedied by legal arrangements, including their extreme form, hierarchy (see Williamson, 1979).
Economic historians, economic sociologists, and the current form of TCE further incorporated
the social dimension of governance, e.g., social relationships and trust, into the governance
framework (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; Greif, 1994; Williamson & Ouchi, 1981). This section first
reviews the governance mechanisms along the market-contract-hierarchy continuum, which is
the key component of the traditional TCE. It is followed by an introduction to the literature on
the role of social sanctions in economic transactions governance.

2.2.1. Transaction governance along the market-contract-hierarchy continuum
The traditional transaction costs economics theory (TCE) holds that the failure of governance
from pure market forces (i.e., the price system) can be compensated for by nonmarket
institutions, which are conceptualized as legal contracting and, its extreme form, hierarchy (i.e.,
internalization of external transactions; see Williamson, 1979, 1985). Because firms can be
treated as a composition of multiple contracts, hierarchy is also considered a form of legal
arrangement (see Stinchcombe, 1985). For the sake of simplicity, here I conceptualize the
market-contract-hierarchy continuum as pure market sanctions and its standard remedy of legal
sanctions. Of course, pure market and pure hierarchy rarely exist in the real world, since most
transactions are contractual in nature, where legal remedies are always needed to compensate for
the weakness of market power in sanctioning economic transactions.
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2.2.1.1. Market sanctions
Economic transactions are believed to be best governed under pure market sanctions, which refer
to the price system in orthodox economics (see Smith, 1981). Under such a system, economic
agents are believed to be able to influence each other’s behavior solely by price and personal
utility preference (Arrow, 1974). Each agent offers prices to solicit exchange from others and
each agent makes her decision to accept or refuse those inducements. Sellers agree to trade with
whoever offers the highest price, regardless of the buyer’s personal identity. Here, prices play an
important coercive role by discouraging inefficient behavior (see Ouchi, 1980). For instance, if a
buyer feels the seller’s price is acceptable, she will reward the seller with more transactions in
the future; otherwise, the buyer will punish the seller by simply walking away to find a better
seller.
Economic reality, however, often deviates from the classical assumptions of flexible market
entry and exit and free and full access to accurate market information (Grossman & Stiglitz,
1976; Zelizer, 1988). For prices to guide individual actions efficiently in reaping the benefits of
specialization, they must accurately reflect the value of goods and services. This in turn assumes
that the value of output can be accurately measured beforehand by the transacting parties
(Akerlof, 1970; Barzel, 1982; Spence, 1976), which is actually impossible due to bounded
human rationality and uncertain environments (Williamson, 1985). Besides, the actual
transaction group is not large enough as assumed which renders free market entry and exit
unrealistic (Caves & Porter, 1977). In addition, asset specificity also increases the costs of free
entry or exit, even if the transaction group is large. These factors reduce the price-based selfenforcing power in voluntary arm’s-length transactions and thus make market sanctions
inadequate in governing transactions (Arrow, 1971).

2.2.1.2. Legal sanctions
When market sanctions alone fail to regulate transactions, the TCE theory suggests that formal
legal arrangements (including the extreme form, hierarchy) can be used to compensate for
market imperfections and provide additional governance (Williamson, 1985). Legal sanctions
use formal contracts to define transaction terms, but they rely on third-party enforcement to
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ensure compliance to the contractual terms. As a third-party enforcement mechanism, legal
sanctions require costly investment in the setting up of an effective legal system, including the
court, legal codes, and legal professionals. In addition, the costs of drafting contracts are usually
high. Given bounded human rationality and environmental uncertainty, contracts are not always
exhaustive, which makes opportunism a big problem in contract negotiation (Williamson, 1985).
These factors indicate that contractual transactions upheld by legal sanctions may fail in
governing transactions. Hence, like market sanctions, legal sanctions are not perfect either. The
governance of economic transactions still requires additional mechanisms.

2.2.2. The role of social sanctions in transaction governance
Economists also recognize that social sanctions, along with legal sanctions, play a role in
supplementing market sanctions to govern transactions. Economic historians believe that the
development of nonmarket exchange governance mechanisms is a process of institutional
evolution that supplements social sanctions with legal sanctions, and that under the
circumstances where legal sanctions are not sufficient in supplementing market sanctions, social
sanctions can provide additional governance to facilitate transactions (see Greif, 2004; Milgrom,
North & Weingast, 1990; North, 1990, 1991, 1994).
In economic life, social sanctions can actually be very efficient in mediating transactions
between interdependent individuals, because common values and beliefs harmonize mutual
interests and eradicate opportunistic behavior (see Ouchi, 1980). Along with classial and neoclassical contractual laws, relational contracts, supported by social sanctions, help to adjust longterm economic relations (Macneil, 1978). They play that role through “encompassing such basic
relational norms as role integrity, reciprocity, contractual solidarity, balancing power in
acceptable ways, propriety of means (doing things the right way), and harmonizing the relations
with the external social matrix in which they occur” (Macneil, 1985).
Given the existence of such a fact, some economists criticized the earlier versions of transaction
cost economics for neglecting the role of social sanctions and delineating market transactions
sharply between those governed by market sanctions and others by legal sanctions (e.g., Demsetz,
1988). In their later work, transaction cost economists began to recognize social sanctions as the
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third mechanism in governing market transactions. In his joint work with Ouchi, for instance,
Williamson (1981) developed the concept of “soft contracting,” where informal, uncodified, and
trust-based relationships foster the context that provides additional governance support for
market transactions.
Across the economics literature, numerous studies have recognized the role of social sanctions in
economic life. For instance, Arrow (1974: 26) argued that “societies in their evolution have
developed implicit agreements to certain kinds of regard for others, agreements which are
essential to the survival of the society or at least contribute greatly to the efficiency of its
working.” Such “agreements” and “regards” are social sanctions that can coordinate the behavior
of economic agents. Others have also argued that social sanctions contribute to efficiency and
productivity by enhancing stability and certainty in exchange relationships (Biggart & Beamish,
2003) and by increasing cooperation among individuals (Cooter, 1998). According to Macaulay
(1963), even in the United States where legal sanctions are the dominant means for regulating
economic transactions, businesses sometimes still rely on “a man’s word” or “common honesty
and decency” (i.e., social sanctions) instead of on legal sanctions to adjust exchange relationships.
By conceptualizing economic relations as an always-embedded system, some scholars have
further established the governance role of social sanctions in our economic life. They suggest
that social sanctions constitute a favorable economic dynamic in human life that enables
economic interactions to happen more smoothly (Block, 2003; Polanyi, 2001:57). Granovetter
(1985) and Zelizer (1988) emphasized the function of social sanctions in economic life by
arguing that market transactions are embedded in institutionalized social relations under a variety
of cultural and structural settings where social sanctions play a major role in governing exchange
relationships. Similar arguments can also be found in studies by Biggart and Delbridge (2004),
Bradach and Eccles (1989), Li (2003), and Lindberg, Campbell, and Hollingsworth (1991), to
name a few.

2.3. Sociological Studies on Social Sanctions
As noted above, economists have identified social sanctions as a key mechanism in regulating
the behavior of economic agents. Social sanctions in fact are a social and psychological process
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through which social norms are enforced and infused with the power to influence human
behavior (Cooter, 1998). Sociologists and social psychologists have developed core principles on
how social sanctions work and how to boost the power of social sanctions.

2.3.1. How social sanctions work
According to sociologists, social sanctions coordinate human behavior through a set of rules
called norms (see Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Opp, 2001). Individuals display a great degree of
coordinated behavior in social interactions simply because of the existence of norms (Axelrod,
1986), which include formalized norms backed by state sanctions (i.e., laws) as well as informal
rules backed by social sanctions (i.e., social norms; Cooter, 1998). Please note that this study on
social sanctions focuses on secular social sanctions only. In reality, social sanctions also include
religious social sanctions, religion being one of the principal social institutions regulating human
behavior (see Iannaccone [1998] for an introduction).
Although there is no consensus on the definition of social norms, one generic point is that social
norms are the collective evaluation and expectation of, and particular reactions (i.e., sanctions) to,
certain behaviors (Gibbs, 1965). This common thread indicates that social norms express a
consensus in a community regarding what people ought to say or do in social interactions and
that deviation from such consensus will be sanctioned (Opp, 2001). Such sanctions are social in
nature because they are imposed on the transgressor by those who are hurt as well as by thirdparty community members who, although not affected by the original transgression, are in a
position to punish the deviant (Bendor & Swistak, 2001). Social sanctions include not only
negative punishment for behavior that is nonconforming but also positive rewards for behavior
that does conform to social norms (Gibbs, 1965).
Social sanctions work at two levels—individual and group—that involve both individual
emotions and group interactions. First, at the individual level, when an individual internalizes a
social norm, he or she makes a moral commitment that attaches a psychological penalty to the
forbidden act (Cooter, 1998). When individuals in a community internalize social norms to
achieve self-improvement, violating an established norm will bring them psychological pain
even if the violation incurs no direct losses or even produces net gains. The efficacy of social
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sanctions thus depends on each individual’s willingness to uphold social norms. Second, at the
group level, because they have internalized the group’s social norms or principles, individuals
are willing to monitor others and punish defectors in social exchanges. In some circumstances,
they are even willing to punish those who fail to punish norm violators (Opp, 2001; Posner,
1997).

2.3.2. How to boost the power of social sanctions?
The power of social sanctions is a combination of forces from individual behavioral and social
structural dimensions within the context of social relations (Etzioni, 2000). Therefore, the power
of social sanctions can be reinforced through changing individual behavior and enacting group
dynamics (see Emerson, 1981; Homans, 1974: 58). In both processes, frequent social interactions
can increase individuals’ willingness to internalize norms and engage in enforcement activities
and to create cohesive (i.e., interdependence) group structures, thereby boosting the power of
social sanctions (Homans, 1974; Horne, 2001, 2004, 2007).

2.3.2.1. Individual behavioral level
Social sanctions are reflected in human emotions such as feelings of personal obligation,
gratitude, and trust (Blau, 1964; Foa & Foa, 1980; Homans, 1958). Exerting influence on such
personal emotions can induce reciprocal behavior and reinforce social sanctions at the individual
level.
Numerous studies have elaborated on the ways to promote individuals’ reciprocal behaviors. For
example, Simmel (1950) described social exchanges like entertainment and gift interactions
(giving and taking) as events during which the giver offers spiritual or intellectual values to the
taker, and the taker shows gratitude by returning affective values or compensates the giver by
injecting will power into her. In a similar way, Sherry (1983) theorized on the ritual and psychic
power of gift-giving by suggesting that the gift-giver invests psychic energy into the gift and
makes it “charged” with that energy. Consequently, according to Sherry, the gift becomes a
container of the being of the giver. By accepting the gift, the taker receives not only the gift, but
also a portion of the being of the giver, which can force the taker to reciprocate following the
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giver’s expectations. Schwartz (1967) used a metaphor similar to those used by these two
scholars, except that what Simmel called the “spirit” and Sherry the “psychic energy” of the giftgiver, Schwartz termed the “identity.”
These metaphors also have solid grounding in psychological studies on social sanctions.
According to Greenberg (1980), the receipt of a benefit places the taker in a psychological state
of indebtedness, which is a state of the obligation to repay the giver: the greater the magnitude,
the greater the resultant arousal and discomfort, and therefore the stronger the desire to reduce it
through reciprocity. Similarly, Simmel (1950) argued that the act of giving and taking could
trigger the emotion of gratitude from the taker, which serves as a psychic imperative that coerces
the taker to reciprocate.
Having internalized such reciprocal behaviors, individuals would abide by exchange rules to
avoid sanctions from self-imposed emotional penalties such as guilt and shame (see Cooter,
1998). Such individuals who did not conform would also be more sensitive to social punishments
such as peer pressure, social disapproval, and community ostracism, and would be more willing
to follow exchange rules in the future (see Noussair & Tucker, 2005). This would further
enhance the power of social sanctions.

2.3.2.2. Social structural level
The reinforcement of the power of social sanctions also depends on the realignment of
relationships and the enacting of group dynamics at the social structural level (Emerson, 1981).
Empirical evidence supports this proposition, indicating that reformation of relationships and
construction of cohesive group structures are all conducive to the effective working of social
sanctions (e.g., Ruth, Brunnel & Otnes, 2004; Ruth, Otnes & Brunel, 1999).
Sociologists have developed various theories on how to mobilize structural factors to boost the
power of social sanctions. This is in fact a process of extending the individual level mechanisms
to the structural level dynamics. According to Gouldner (1960), social exchange such as
entertainment can realign social structures by mobilizing egoistic motivations and channeling
them into the maintenance of the social system. Following Gouldner’s theory, egoism can
motivate one party to satisfy the expectations of the other, since by doing so she induces the

26

latter to reciprocate and satisfy her own expectations. Once a stable relation of mutual
gratification has been established, the system is self-perpetuating through a beneficent cycle of
mutual reinforcement. Here social exchange reinforces the norm of reciprocity, which serves as
both a starting mechanism and a stabilizing function in interpersonal relations: it helps to initiate
social exchanges and then to sustain and reinforce them. Consequently, within the reciprocal
relationship, social sanctions become more powerful in regulating individual behavior (Homans,
1974; Horne, 2007).
From an interpersonal power and dominance perspective, Bourdieu (1977: 183) argued that
In societies which have no ‘self-regulating market’ (in Karl Polanyi’s sense), no
educational system, no juridical apparatus, and no State, relations of domination
can be set up and maintained only at the cost of strategies which must be
endlessly renewed, because the conditions required for a mediated lasting
appropriation of other agents’ labor, services, or homage have not been brought
together.
Repeated social interactions such as entertainment therefore become a major instrument for
exercising influence on others in societies where the personal strategic mode of domination
functions as the major power mechanism. For instance, in an entertainment activity like gift
giving and taking interaction, once the taker accepts the entertainment, he or she loses power and
status relative to the giver and becomes a social inferior and subordinate; the only way for the
taker to pay back may be to also accept the orders of the giver (Blau, 1964; Burt, 1992; Homans,
1974). The imbalance of power and indebtedness between the giver and the taker will ensure
continued relationships and therefore strengthen the power of social sanctions (see Schwartz,
1967; Simmel, 1950).
At the group level, these cohesive structures in turn can promote repeated interactions among the
same individuals (Horne, 2007), which can generate a higher degree of social approval and
promote cooperation (Homans, 1974). Here behavioral norms are more easily established and
enforced (see Axelrod, 1984: 129). The physical proximity exposes individual activities to group
surveillance, making it easier to impose social sanctions on those members who violate exchange
rules (Ruth et al., 2004). In such occasions, individuals are even willing to monitor and punish
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those who fail to punish defectors in unrelated social and economic exchanges (see Opp, 2001;
Posner, 1997). As such, frequent social exchanges can weave cohesive social structures that
make social sanctions work more effectively.
In addition to the different levels of analyses, some scholars also incorporated the time factor
into the analysis of the strength of social sanctions. They argue that time is a key factor in
promoting reciprocal behavior and long-term and group orientation in relationship building
(Sharma & Patterson, 1987), which in turn are critical conditions for social sanctions to work
more effectively (see Altman & Taylor, 1973). Elsewhere, Knapp (1984) has classified the time
factor in a relationship into five stages, from early to late—initiating, experiencing, intensifying,
integrating, and bonding—and argues that the strength of social sanction increases as the
relationship develops and moves through those five stages.

2.4. Summary of Literature Review
Despite the prevalence of business entertainment worldwide, most former studies have examined
the phenomenon from a social perspective. Although some of them have recognized business
entertainment’s role in facilitating economic exchanges, they have not linked this facilitating
function with the concept of economic transaction governance. Meanwhile, the traditional TCE
framework does not consider the role of social sanctions in the traditional market-contracthierarchy continuum, nor examine the function of business entertainment in facilitating exchange
relationships.
Although TCE scholars have recently recognized the role of social sanctions in transaction
governance, such a role has not been incorporated into the traditional transaction costs
economics theory (TCE) with a systematical approach. In addition, despite their recognition of
the role of social sanctions in economic transaction governance, few economists have gone
further to explore the relationship between social sanctions and the omnipresent entertainment
activities in business settings. At the same time, sociologists have developed core principles on
how social sanctions work and how the power of social sanctions may be boosted. Consequently,
such fragmentation has formed the major gaps in the current literature.
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The Literature Gaps:
Lacking a Transaction Governance Perspective
on Business Entertainment

The Traditional MarketContract-Hierarchy Continuum

Negative View:
BE Is a Social Vice
Literature on
Business
Entertainment

Literature on
Transaction
Governance

Positive View:
BE Plays a Positive Role

Social Sanctions and Its Role in
Transaction Governance

Figure 2.1. The Literature Gaps
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Figure 2.1 illustrates these literature gaps. The left-hand side depicts the management literature
that has somewhat addressed the business entertainment phenomenon through two conflicting
views. The right-hand side shows the transaction governance literature that is conceptualized as a
market-contract-hierarchy continuum plus the recognition of the role of social sanctions in
transaction governance, and the sociological literature on social sanctions. These literature gaps
pose a series of questions regarding why the business entertainment taker is willing to be
“corrupted” (if it is truly corruptive), whether or not business entertainment plays a positive role,
how it plays such a role, how to boost the power of social sanctions in transaction governance,
and why the pervasiveness of business entertainment varies across societies. The new agenda in
my dissertation, therefore, is to bridge these gaps and answer the questions by setting up an
integrated framework upon which a systematic explanation for business entertainment can be
constructed.

2.5. New Agenda: A Systematic and Multidisciplinary Approach
Based on the extant literature on business entertainment and transaction governance, my agenda
is to provide an explanation for business entertainment from the perspective of economic
transaction governance. I begin by proposing the relativity of transaction governance structures
(TGS), that is, that each society, depending on its cultural and historical heritages, features a
unique combination of market, social, and legal sanctions in regulating economic transactions. I
further argue that business entertainment serves as a significant amplifier of social sanctions in
alleviating market failure, especially in societies where market and legal infrastructures are
underdeveloped. This two-step approach maps the business entertainment literature onto the
economics literature on transaction governance and sets up an integrated theoretical framework
for systematically explaining the business entertainment phenomenon from a transaction
governance perspective.
Figure 2.2 provides an illustration of the integrated framework. In this figure, horizontally, the
dotted rectangle represents a transaction governance structure, where each society features a
relatively different combination of market, social, and legal sanctions in governing transactions.
Vertically, the figure depicts the relationship that I theorize existing between business
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entertainment, social sanctions, and transaction governance, i.e., that business entertainment has
the potential to reinforce social sanctions to supplement market sanctions in regulating the
behaviors of economic agents to govern transactions. In particular, business entertainment will
be more prevalent and effective in societies where social sanctions play a greater role in
governing economic activities. I will develop this framework in the next chapter.

Business Entertainment

Market Sanctions

Social Sanctions

Legal Sanctions

Transaction Governance

Figure 2.2. An Integrated Framework of Business Entertainment Reinforcing Social
Sanctions to Facilitate Transaction Governance
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Chapter 3
3. Relativity of Transaction Governance Structures and the Role
of Business Entertainment
This chapter first presents the model of transaction governance structure (TGS), which consists
of market, legal, and social sanctions, and proposes the relativity of TGS at the society, industry,
and firm levels. Building upon this TGS framework, the chapter then establishes the association
between social sanctions and business entertainment by arguing that business entertainment
plays a role in reinforcing the power of social sanctions in regulating the behavior of economic
agents, particularly when market and legal infrastructures are underdeveloped, and thereby social
sanctions play a more important role in transaction governance.

3.1. Transaction Governance Structure
Transaction governance is a fundamental problem in all economic systems (see Coase, 1992;
Williamson, 1985). Governance rules regulate exchanges that not only enable economic agents
to complement one another with distinct material endowments but also allow them to split the
gains from specialization and create the incentives to further maximize output (Alchian &
Demsetz, 1972; Greif, 2000). The mechanisms for transaction governance include social, market,
and legal sanctions (see Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Lindberg et al., 1991), which have evolved to
form a unique TGS that is relatively different across societies or under different circumstances at
the industry or firm level.
3.1.1. Evolution of Transaction Governance Structures
3.1.1.1. The governance of social interactions: Social sanctions
Human beings have the propensity to expand personal well-being or wealth to cope with the
issue of scarcity (Commons, 1924; Hume, 1957). Wealth can be expanded through cooperative
interactions such as team production, division of labor, and voluntary exchange. Group living
makes such cooperative interactions possible and has played a key role in civilization. For
example, in the hunting and gathering age, pooling the joint efforts of a group could maximize
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gains and increase survival chances, and sharing harvests by a group could motivate others to
reciprocate, which in turn would insure oneself from bad harvest and therefore reduce
uncertainty.
For team production and voluntary exchange to occur, group living requires coordination under
behavioral rules that individuals expect each other to follow. Rules coordinate and motivate
interdependent behaviors in team production and voluntary exchange, in that one individual’s
compliance or disobedience will influence the choice and reaction of the other. Over time
behavioral rules or patterns have evolved into what we now know as norms of cooperation and
reciprocity. Conforming to those norms generates social sanctions to guide human interactions
(Ridley, 1996: 105–117).
Social sanctions are a social and psychological process through which behavioral norms are
infused with the power to influence human behaviors and hence can be enforced to regulate
social activities. Like the roles of cooperation and reciprocity, the roles of social norms are to
provide a collective evaluation and expectation of, and particular reactions (i.e., sanctions) to,
certain behaviors (Gibbs, 1965). Individuals display a great degree of coordinated behavior
simply because of the existence of norms (Axelrod, 1986). Social norms express a consensus in a
community regarding what people ought to say or do, and deviation from such consensus will be
sanctioned (Opp, 2001). Such sanctions are social in nature because they are imposed on the
transgressor by those who are hurt as well as by third-party community members who, although
not affected by the original transgression, are in a position to punish the deviant (Bendor &
Swistak, 2001). For instance, a bystander whose own interest is not affected by a transgression
may choose, if he or she is armed with certain social norms, to punish the transgressor.
Social sanctions include not only negative punishment following nonconforming behavior but
also positive rewards for compliance to social norms (Gibbs, 1965). Social sanctions mediate
exchanges by harmonizing mutual interests and eradicating opportunistic behaviors with
common values and beliefs (see Macneil, 1978; Ouchi, 1980). They contribute to efficiency and
productivity by enhancing stability and certainty in exchange relationships (see Biggart &
Beamish, 2003). Social sanctions served as the key mechanism governing the behavior of group
members in facilitating cooperation and exchange in primitive societies and early human history
(see Benson, 1999).
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The functioning of social sanctions is limited to communal or intra-group settings, where social
sanctions deter repeatedly interacting individuals from wrong-doing with the threat that
misconduct will cause self-conscious emotional penalties such as embarrassment, shame, and
guilt; result in public disproval and ostracism; and lead to a loss of reputation and/or future gains
from exchange (Fiske, 2005; Noussair & Tucker, 2005). Effective social sanctions can reinforce
the relationships within a group, and cohesive social structure within groups or communities can
in turn generate stronger social sanctions (Homans, 1974; Horne, 2007). Those self-enforcing
mechanisms enabled social sanctions to facilitate exchanges in primitive societies where both
social and economic exchanges were conducted mostly within a communal group. When intergroup exchange became necessary and frequent, however, social sanctions became less effective
in governing inter-group exchanges, and other forms of mechanisms had to develop to govern
human interactions.
As human activities extended from intra- to inter-group interactions, social exchange became
more objectified and started to acquire the features of economic exchange (Simmel, 1950). For
example, when a hunting and gathering community evolved into specialized groups of hunters or
gatherers, exchange of harvest (e.g., barter) between them became a necessity. Further
specialization of labor, greater mobility, better information flow, better transportation means, the
usage of money, and the emergence of marketplaces (e.g., bazaars) and professional merchants
expanded exchanges to strangers outside the boundaries of communities. In such exchanges,
community-based social sanctions could not function effectively. Furthermore, these
developments required exchanges to have more accurate measurement and exact fairness
(Seabright, 2004: 67–78). Market sanctions based on the price mechanism thus emerged as
another governance device to facilitate transactions.

3.1.1.2. Market sanctions
In exchanges governed by market sanctions, economic agents influence each other’s behavior by
price and personal preference (Arrow, 1974). Each agent offers prices to solicit exchange from
others and each agent makes the decision to accept or refuse those inducements based on the
principle of maximizing his or her own profit. Unlike social sanctions that are effective only in
communal groups, market sanctions can support exchange even with strangers from outside a
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group. In such transactions, sellers agree to trade with whoever is offering the highest price,
regardless of the buyer’s personal identity. Here prices play an important coercive role by
discouraging inefficient behaviors (see Ouchi, 1980). For instance, if a buyer feels the seller’s
price is acceptable, the buyer would reward the seller with more transactions in the future;
otherwise, the buyer would punish the seller by simply walking away to find a new seller.
Unlike transactions supported by social sanctions, which are often an ongoing process, priceenabled transactions are often one-shot and self-liquidating, as in spot-market exchanges, where
sellers and buyers keep an arm’s-length distance. Both sellers and buyers are assumed to have
free entry into and free exit from a transactional relationship. It is the “invisible hand” that
directs movements of commodities and coordinates activities of self-interested economic agents
(Smith, 1981: 25). The impersonality and ephemerality (i.e., one-shot) of arm’s-length
transactions governed by market sanctions suggest that market sanctions are powerful cognitive
simplifiers that radically reduce the complexity of human interactions and therefore turn out to
be a more efficient means of governance (Bowles, Choi & Hopfensitz, 2003).
The essence of price-based arm’s-length transactions is the rational calculation of costs and
benefits based on the price mechanism (i.e., market sanctions) (Zelizer, 1988). Economic reality,
however, often deviates from the classical assumptions of flexible market entry and exit and free
and full access to accurate market information (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1976). For prices to guide
individual actions efficiently in reaping the benefits of, for example, specialization, they must
accurately reflect the value of goods and services. This in turn assumes that the value of output
can be accurately measured beforehand by transacting parties (Barzel, 1982), which is actually
impossible due to bounded human rationality (Williamson, 1985). Besides, the actual transaction
group is not large enough as assumed which renders free market entry and exit unrealistic. These
factors reduce the price-based self-enforcing power in voluntary arm’s-length transactions and
thus make market sanctions inadequate in governing transactions (Arrow, 1971).
Market failure becomes a prominent issue particularly when economic activities and market
transactions become more complicated and more powerful, and effective governance thus means
other than social and market sanctions are needed in transaction governance (North, 1990).
Again, take the aforementioned hunting and gathering groups as examples. Over time, each of
these groups evolved into larger societies consisting of numerous sub-groups. The development
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of long distance trade between groups made it harder for traders to monitor each other’s behavior.
Increased group size led to anonymity among group members, which encouraged opportunistic
behavior and misrepresentation of trade information. These developments made social and
market sanctions less efficient in regulating transactions. Therefore, formal legal institutions,
which could support contractual transactions with impartial third-party sanctions (e.g., from the
state), arose to fill the gap (Greif, 2004; Milgrom et al., 1990).

3.1.1.3. Rise of legal institutions
Legal sanctions support contractual transactions based on a third-party impartial enforcer with
coercive power (Greif, 2000). Such contracts are drafted on the basis that they are fair, voluntary,
conforming to society’s contractual expectations, and without administrative difficulties
(Macneil, 1985). The third-party enforcer is an effective system including the laws, the courts,
and legal professionals backed up by the state. It regulates individual behavior with the threat of
increasing their costs and with punishment based on law, if individuals cheat or fail to fulfill
their contractual obligations.
Similar to market sanctions, but unlike social sanctions that support relational transactions, legal
sanctions facilitate impersonal exchanges, where the decision to exchange is not conditioned on
knowing a current partner’s past conducts or on expecting future trading opportunities. Different
from market sanctions, legal sanctions deter deviant behaviors with the threat of punishment
based on third-party sanctions (i.e., laws) to force individuals to fulfill their contractual
obligations.
Legal sanctions require costly investment to set up an effective legal system, including the court,
legal codes, and legal professionals. As such, legal sanctions are marked by high fixed costs to
set up the legal framework but low variable costs of establishing new exchange relationships (Li,
2003). Prohibiting the excessive gains or rewards that are possible under other modes, legal
sanctions are effective in maximizing overall societal welfare (Glaeser & Shleifer, 2002). Yet
legal sanctions are not the panacea for transaction governance. When the costs of drafting
contracts are high or when contracts are not exhaustive, for instance, contractual transactions
upheld by legal sanctions may fail as well (see Williamson, 1985).
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Table 3.1. The Properties of Transaction Governance Mechanisms
Market Sanctions

Legal Sanctions

Social Sanctions

Arm’s length

Contractual

Relational

Price

Legal institutions

Norms

One-shot-based

Definite term

Long term

Interaction

Impersonal

Impersonal

Personal

Nature

Voluntary

Drafted voluntarily &
backed-up by State

Community pressure

Fairness

Assumed exact value

Agreed-on value

Approximate value

Context

Beyond groups

Beyond groups

Intra-group

Transaction type
Instruments
Duration

3.1.1.4. Summary
The key properties of the three governance mechanisms described above are summarized in
Table 3.1. Within the three mechanisms, social sanctions can facilitate relational transactions
based on norms in a communal setting. In this type of transaction, the seller and buyer must
know each other and the relationship must be oriented to the long term. Each transaction is
conducted in approximate fairness in the hope that any deficiency may be reciprocated in future
transactions. Social sanctions can only support intra-group exchanges in a communal setting that
cannot be extended to strangers.
Market sanctions in turn often support one-shot transactions conducted at arm’s length and based
solely on the price system. In such transactions, the seller and buyer exchange voluntarily and
without the need to know each other. The one-shot transaction also allows for intergroup
exchanges without the need to restrain transactions within a community. The value of the trade is
assumed fair enough to match the price exactly.
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Finally, legal sanctions can support contractual transactions engaged in voluntarily but backed up
by third-party coercion—the legal institutions. Like in market sanctions, the seller and buyer do
not need to know each other before conducting a transaction. They can transact in a fixed term
stipulated by a contract that is mutually agreed on. The fairness between price and value is also
stipulated in the contract. Legal sanctions also enable strangers to trade with each other beyond
groups.
3.1.2. The Transaction Governance Structure (TGS)
Regarding the three governance mechanisms, in reality, market, social, and legal sanctions are
not mutually exclusive in governing economic transactions. Economic sociologists believe that
economic relations are embedded in interactions among individual self-motivations (i.e., market
sanctions), state actions (i.e., legal sanctions), and social norms (i.e., social sanctions) (see
Polanyi, 2001). Accordingly, economic transactions are governed by a combination of market
forces and institutionalized social relations (Granovetter, 1985; Zelizer, 1988), which are often
classified as market, social, and legal sanctions (see, e.g., Biggart & Delbridge, 2004; Bradach &
Eccles, 1989; Lindberg et al., 1991; Ouchi, 1980). I define such a combination as a transaction
governance structure (TGS).
3.1.2.1. Evolution of TGS in a society
Like all institutions governing human interactions, a transaction governance structure (TGS) that
regulates the behavior of economic agents is derived from the interactions among market, social,
and legal sanctions (i.e., the co-evolution of individual behavior and social institutions; see
Bowles et al., 2003). Market sanctions are ideal but not perfect; therefore, social and legal
sanctions are needed to supplement market sanctions in governing transactions. For example,
social and legal sanctions serve to guarantee property rights in order to conduct market
transactions. On the other hand, social and legal sanctions may also affect the efficiency and
effectiveness of market sanctions. That is why the market is not always clear: sometimes there
are authoritative and sentimental elements such as fairness, esteem, reputation, and long-term
considerations that are implicitly contained in prices. In addition, social and legal sanctions also
provide protective countermoves to curb the insatiable “invisible hand” from immoral activities
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that make perfect economic sense, such as abusing child labor, destroying the natural
environment, or trafficking drugs, weapons, and human beings (see Polanyi, 2001).
Market sanctions in turn can weaken the forces of social and legal sanctions. Market forces
disrupt other social institutions by permeating all aspects of human life. Market operations may
commodify politics, family life, friendship, education, arts, human settlement patterns, religion,
and so on (Polanyi, 1977). For example, market forces reduce the need for compassion,
patriotism, brotherly love, and cultural solidarity (Schultze, 1977). Market forces may thus
undermine the basis of social sanctions, corrupt impartial legal institutions, and render both
social and legal sanctions less effective in supplementing market sanctions to govern transactions.
As well, social sanctions and legal sanctions can influence each other—social sanctions are
reinforced partly by legal sanctions, and laws are indeed legalized social norms (Cooter, 1998).
Meanwhile, social fabrics that constitute the conditions for social sanctions to work make
impartial enforcement of legal sanctions difficult. For instance, the practices of nepotism and
cronyism could undermine the fairness of legal sanctions.
According to economic historians, an institutional structure that facilitates exchange and fosters
economic efficiency is cultivated in a broader social, political, and cultural process; once a
particular institutional structure has developed in a society, it can propel itself to evolve along a
particular path (Greif, 2000; North, 1981). As for the evolution of TGS in a society, during the
interplay among market, legal, and social sanctions, a more efficient form emerges to govern
economic transactions through an evolutionary process of natural selection; and the form that is
best suited to prevailing in a particular environment is most likely to survive in that environment
(see Hannan & Freeman, 1977; Nelson & Winter, 1982). As such, TGS in a society will evolve
over time to form an optimal combination of market, social, and legal sanctions that best fits the
environmental contexts of the society.

3.1.2.2. The relativity of TGS
During the institutional evolution process described above, the ecological, cultural, and historical
context of each society shapes its unique TGS that regulates the behaviors of economic agents in
business transactions (see Berry, 1979). One mechanism’s waxing and another’s waning in the
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interaction process can lead to the formation of a particular TGS featuring more of one
mechanism but less of others among social, market, and legal sanctions. Hence, in a certain
developmental stage, each society tends to rely more on one mechanism but less on another in
regulating market transactions. I call this pattern the relativity of TGS across societies, which is
illustrated below through a comparison of China, the United States, and Japan.

3.1.2.2.1. Comparison among China, the U.S., and Japan

3.1.2.2.1.1. China
In most of its history, China has been an agrarian society where indigenous people live in a
community-based life pattern. Originating from Confucian heritages, Chinese rulers advocated
rule of norms instead of rule of law. Meanwhile, the official suppression of commerce and
supporting of agriculture prevented the development of a market economy (see Balazs, 1965; Fei,
1939; Fried, 1969). These heritages led China to form its unique national characteristics as
described in the following four dimensions.
Collectivist orientation. The Chinese civilization has been the main source of oriental culture.
Following the tradition of Confucianism, each Chinese person identifies herself or himself by his
or her relative position to others, and each person’s conduct is required to be aligned with the
collective well-being and natural harmony of the greater community (Hamilton, 2006b). Each
person’s reputation is therefore associated with the reputation of the whole community. People
voluntarily monitor each other’s behavior to make sure that no reputational damage is brought to
the community.
The social fabrics in such a collectivist society make monitoring of deviant behaviors easier and
therefore support social sanctions. At the same time, such a relationship-based social structure
makes impartial enforcement of legal sanctions difficult. For example, litigation, spelled as
“daguansi” in Chinese, is often in a play of words referred to as “daguanxi” in China, meaning
“comparing which side between the plaintiff and defendant has the better guanxi network.” This
example indicates that social relationships in a collectivist society can interrupt legal sanctions in
a great magnitude. As a result, social sanctions play a more important role than legal sanctions in
regulating individual behavior and exchanges in China.
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Rule of norms rather than rule of law. Under the influence of the Confucian heritage, Chinese
rulers advocated rule of norms rather than rule of law. Confucius said that although governing by
laws and punishment can make people obey, it cannot cultivate people’s virtues; governing by
moral forces and rituals can make people feel ashamed of wrong-doing and become good (The
Analects of Confucius: Book 2—Chapter 3, 2002).
These basic principles define the major function of the Chinese law as the punishment of those
who have failed to conform to norms; the responsibility of enforcement and sanctions of the law
are left to the society (Balazs, 1965). Conflicts between individuals are mediated and solved by
members within the community. There are no formal codes governing commerce and merchants.
Disputes arising from business transactions are settled within craft or merchant guilds (Hamilton,
2006b).
After the last imperial dynasty collapsed in 1911, neither the nationalists before 1949, nor the
communists hereafter, made much progress in establishing an efficient legal system in mainland
China (see Appelbaum, 1998; Balazs, 1965; Orts, 2001). As a result, China still has a weak legal
system today, although it has continued the effort to build a modern legal system (Potter, 2002).
Rather, social sanctions are heavily relied on in transaction governance.
Inefficient market. China provides a good case of an immature market. In Chinese history, the
Confucian teachings ranked social hierarchy in an order that placed the literati on the top and the
merchants at the bottom (Hamilton, 2006a). In the economic sphere, agriculture was supported
and commerce was suppressed. These value propositions were reflected in official policies
through dynasties and led China to the trajectory of an agrarian society with a natural economy
of autarky.
Throughout Chinese history, produces were consumed locally with little exchange; labor was
bound to the land; and capital was largely consumed or reinvested into the land with little
accumulation (Fei, 1939). The Chinese dynasties changed, but the institutions, including the
orthodox Confucian principles, carried on. The social and economic structures in China have


The word autarky appeared in English in the 1610s from the Greek word autarkeia, meaning “self-sufficient,
having enough, independent of others.” In the late 1930s, it started to be used as a term in international economics,
referring to an economically self-sufficient country that is not dependent on international trade.
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never been challenged with social transformations like the Western Enlightenment. As a
consequence, unlike the West, China has an economic sector that has not been separated from
the rest of the social life (see Polanyi, 2001). Land, labor, and capital in China have all failed to
become commodities, which is a necessary condition for capitalism to emerge and florish. This
often becomes a popular explanation for the absence of a market economy in China (Hamilton,
2006b). An inefficient market naturally increases the chances of using more social sanctions.
Lower human mobility. Confucius taught that each individual should stay where he is without
traveling far away, especially when his parents are still alive. When a person must leave his
hometown, he must have another fixed place to stay (The Analects of Confucius: Book 4—
Chapter 20, 2002). Economically, China has been an agrarian society throughout the nation’s
history, and labor has been fettered to the land with little mobility. Individuals in China
interacted with one another only within a given social and economic group or community
without much trade with, and few commercial connections with, long-distance strangers (see
Fried, 1969). This is another important factor that led China to be a low mobility society.
In such a society with lower human mobility, it is easier for individuals to have frequent
interactions, establish long-term relationships, foster trust, promote cooperation, and develop
behavioral norms in a communal setting. Furthermore, social sanctions can facilitate exchanges
only if the parties involved can monitor each other’s behavior closely and if their interactions are
observable to other members of the community (Bendor & Mookherjee, 1990; Kandori, 1992).
The Chinese society has strongly satisfied these conditions of low human mobility and therefore
social sanctions were more effective and used more often in regulating human behaviors.

3.1.2.2.1.2. The United States
Individualism. In sharp contrast to China, the United States has been an individualistic society
featuring rule of law, an efficient market system, and higher human mobility. The individualist
tradition, inherited from ascetic Protestantism and the liberal culture of the Enlightenment, has
cast the most important influence over the U.S. culture from the days of its formative period
(Parsons, 2007). Weber (1978) argued that starting from the Protestant Reformation, individual
believers became responsible for their own salvation without authoritarian brokers like kings,
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popes, or religious judges. By the time of the Enlightenment, people logically became
responsible for their own conduct and began to make their own rational calculations. This is the
social origin of Western individualism, which has been persistent in U.S. society since early
European immigrants brought the tradition to the new continent in colonial times (see Inglehart
& Baker, 2000; Goldstein & Eichhorn, 1961).
In such an individualistic society, people treat all exchange partners the same way, regardless of
whether they are inside or outside a group or community. Transactions are not based on longterm repeated patterns. People care more about a current transaction while future opportunities to
transact are not a major concern. Transactions in such a society are characterized as price-based
impersonal exchanges whereby sellers and buyers are driven by self-interest and less affected by
social relations (Greif, 1994). Legal documents (i.e., contracts), instead of social relationships,
become the key binding mechanism for economic relationships. While an individualist society
lacks the social fabric to support social sanctions, impartial enforcement of the laws is relatively
easy because the parties involved tend not to keep close personal relationships. As such, social
sanctions are less effective and hence used less often in the United States (vs. China).
Rule of law. Unlike China, the United States has relied heavily on a well-developed legal system
to regulate market transactions. A number of factors have led to this unique feature. First, the
United States became a colony not by Europeans coming to govern a large indigenous population,
such as was the case in Latin America or Africa. Instead, its core social structure was composed
of settlers of European origin, who largely displaced the ‘native’ (Parsons, 2007). This unique
social structure makes possible the selective appropriation of the European heritages and the
creation of new institutions adapting to the frontier (Engerman & Sokoloff, 2008).
Second, more fundamentally, Weber (1978) believed that rationalism, which is based on the
belief that the validity and legitimacy of power rest in rational rules, contributed to the
configuration of legal-rational domination in Western societies. Inspired by such beliefs, the
society set up legal institutions to guarantee the political and economic rights of individuals who
owned properties and engaged in exchanges (Hirschman, 1982). These beliefs provide the
foundations for the Western tradition of rule of law (Appelbaum, 1998). Originating from the
same Enlightenment thoughts, the legal status of organizations is recognized in the U.S., and
Western organizational logics are developed based on the principle that private citizens and
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individual firms are the key economic agents in society (Hamilton, 2006a).
Third, from its early years of independence, the country’s rapid territorial and demographic
expansion, industrialization, increasing trade with Europe and across the American continent,
massive immigration, and the absorption of new arrivals all created strong demand for a new
institutional framework. These developments complicated business transactions to the extent that
they can be best supported only through an efficient legal system (see Lipset, 1993; Parsons,
2007).
These factors, to a larger degree, shaped the institutional structure of the new nation (Richter,
1969). The United States, from the very beginning, “favored the development of an efficient
legal system to a particularly important place in the structure of the society” (Parsons, 2007). As
a result, the Americans became a much more litigious people. They not only are more likely to
sue the government, but also show greater propensity to sue each other (Lipset, 1993).
Efficient market. The United States boasts a highly efficient market system backed up by a
highly efficient legal system. Since colonial times, cross-Atlantic trade with Europe has been the
major feature of the American economy. After the Second World War, the United States as a
single nation has continuously been the world’s largest economy and market. It has been the
largest trade partner to many countries in the world (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008).
The United States has the world’s largest stock exchange—the New York Stock Exchange; it
also has the world’s largest commodities and futures exchange center—the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. The surging information industry since the 1990s has also enabled the United States
to develop the largest online trading network in the world. Overall, the highly competitive
business environment, liberal trade policies, highly fluent information flow, and huge market
size indicate that the U.S. is an epitome of a mature market. Accordingly, market imperfections
are less severe and social sanctions should be used less in compensating for market failure.
Higher human mobility. The United States is an immigrant society, where high mobility has
been the most important symbol of individual rights and liberty. Early days’ rapid
industrialization, urbanization, and territorial expansion, and later days’ development of railroad
systems, highway networks, and civil aviation industry and networks, as well as the booming of
the auto industry, have all helped Americans to realize the dream of mobility. Every day,
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millions of Americans are on the road. Travel and related industries have been an important part
of the U.S. national economy (The Travel Industry World Yearbook—The Big Picture, 2003).
Job change, relocation, moving, and business and leisure traveling…indeed, the restlessness of
American life has been regarded as a source of freedom and opportunity (Kopf, 1977).
In such a society featuring higher human mobility, a high rate of residential turnover fosters
institutional disruptions and weakens interpersonal ties (Coleman, 1990: 316). Residential
instability ruptures social fabrics and renders social sanctions less popular and effective,
compared to legal sanctions, delivered through sheriffs, guns, contracts, lawyers, and the court
system, in regulating individual behavior and market transactions. Hence, social sanctions are
less effective and more legal sanctions will be used in transaction governance in the United
States (than in China).
3.1.2.2.1.3. Japan
Collectivist society. Historically, the Japanese society was heavily influenced by Confucianism,
which was introduced into Japan and became popular in the seventh century. The Japanese
society highly resembles that of China in most aspects, including the collectivist orientation. A
more unique feature of Japanese society is that prior to the Meiji Restoration in 1868, in over two
and a half centuries of peace time (Tokugawa era), Japan evolved into a collectivist value system
featuring traditions of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto ethics (Bellah, 1970; Ooms, 1996).
That value system is believed to be the origin of today’s high trust and collectivism in the
Japanese society (Fukuyama, 1995). These conditions foster the rich soil for social sanctions to
work.
Rule of both norms and law. One major difference between the original Confucianism in China
and the Confucianism in Japan is that the latter is a combination of ancient Chinese legalism and
Confucianism traditions, or “Ritsuryo Confucianism,” which emphasizes both rule of law and
rule of norms (Holcombe, 1997). Legalism, which is the ideal of the great ancient Chinese
legalist Han Feizi (280 B.C.–233 B.C.), was one of the rivaling philosophical doctrines, along
with Daoism and Confucianism, during the Warring States period (475 B.C.–221 B.C.) in
ancient China. According to Han Feizi, “no country is permanently strong, nor is any country
permanently weak. A country can be strong if the law administrators are strong; otherwise, the
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country is weak….Strict laws are means to forbid extra-judicial actions and exterminate
selfishness; severe penalties are means to execute decrees….” (Han Feizi: Chapter 6, 2004).
The first emperor of China, Yinzheng (shihuangdi) of the Qin kingdom, unified China in 221 B.C.
and established the Qin dynasty. He advocated legalism and rule of law in his newly established
state (Balazs, 1965). Although later dynasties reverted to Confucianism as the major doctrine for
ruling the country (e.g., Han Dynasty established in 202 B.C.), legalism still left a legacy in
Chinese philosophical thoughts and political practices. This is the origin of the legalism element
in “Ritsuryo Confucianism” that was transmitted into Japan along with other Chinese cultural
heritages.
In addition to the above legalism origin from China, the Japanese legal system has also been
strongly influenced by the West. The Western influence on Japan had a major effect in the 1860s
and reached its peak in the postwar era. During the Meiji Restoration starting in 1868, Japan
emulated the West as it established modern institutions, including a modern legal system (Hunter,
2005; Westney, 1982). Under the U.S.-led Allied occupation after World War II, Japan carried
out a major constitutional reform and established a democratic political system that weakened
the power of the monarch (Upham, 1987).
Those influences from both China and the West have helped Japan to form a unique governance
system. On the one hand, the nation is governed by an efficient legal system, and on the other
hand, it is still maintaining its traditional cultural values through rule by norms (see Fukutake,
1989; Harris, 1982). Thus, the Japanese society is featured as using both traditional norms and
modern laws to regulate individual behavior and market transactions.
Efficient market. As one of the world’s major industrialized countries, Japan features a highly
efficient market system. Japan’s raw material supplies and industrial outputs rely heavily on
international trade (i.e., imports of natural resources and exports of finished goods), which
requires an efficient market system to support and is also an indicator of market efficiency
(North, 1991). Japan also has one of the world’s most efficient financial markets. Strong market
forces render both legal and social remedies for market imperfections less eminent.
Lower human mobility. Like China, Japan was an agrarian society with aboriginal people living
in communal life patterns (Smith, 1959). Compared to China’s geography, Japan’s mountainous
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island features further limit human mobility. In addition, Japanese companies’ practice of
lifetime employment discourages job mobility. As such, low mobility allows Japanese people to
promote reciprocal behavior, build stable and long-term relationships, foster cooperation, and
develop intricate norms in a strong communal setting. In such a social context, social sanctions
work more effectively as a supplement to market sanctions in regulating the behavior of
economic agents.

3.1.2.2.1.4. Summary
Those discrete cultural and historical origins depicted above have created the conditions for
social sanctions to be the dominant mechanism in the TGS of China, but enabled a TGS
dominated by legal sanctions in the U.S., and yet led to quite a unique TGS in Japan featuring
both high legal and high social sanctions in regulating economic transactions.
Figure 3.1 helps to explain the different types of TGS in China, the U.S., and Japan. In this twodimensional space, the x-axis represents a society’s reliance on legal sanctions, while the y-axis
represents its reliance on social sanctions. The oval close to the y-axis represents the TGS of
China that is evolving along ray R-China, where more social but less legal sanctions are relied on,
and the oval close to the x-axis represents the TGS of the U.S., which evolves along ray R-US
where more legal but less social sanctions are applied in transaction governance. The oval in the
middle represents the TGS of Japan, which develops along ray R-Japan, featuring both high
legal and high social sanctions. In other words, in China, social sanctions are the primary remedy
for market imperfections, whereas in the U.S., market imperfections are addressed mainly
through legal sanctions imposed by specialized third-party institutions such as the court and legal
professionals, and in Japan, economic activities are coordinated with both rule of law and social
norms.
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Figure 3.1. Comparison of Transaction Governance Structures (TGS) among China, the
United States, and Japan

3.1.2.2.2. The relativity of TGS within a single country at multiple levels
Based on the model given above (Figure 3.1), all societies can find a distinctive position in the
two-dimensional space that corresponds to the degree of their reliance on social vs. legal
sanctions to supplement market sanctions in regulating economic transactions. We can narrow
the model to a single country, where the relativity of TGS can be observed across regions, simply
because regional disparity may lead some areas to rely more on legal sanctions, but others to
depend more on social sanctions, to address market imperfections. For instance, such factors as
human mobility, population density, market maturity, and availability of legal services may
cause the correcting mechanism for market imperfections (i.e., social or legal sanctions) to vary
across different regions of a country (see Bendor & Mookherjee, 1990; Kandori, 1992; Sampson,
Morenoff, & Earls, 1999).
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The model can also be further narrowed down to the industry level, where variations in TGS
across industries can be found within a single society. For example, certain industries (e.g., those
creating products with high technical complexity) are more likely to suffer from market
imperfections and, as a result, social or legal sanctions, whichever are more immediately
available or more efficient, are used more often as a supplement to market sanctions in governing
business transactions.
Finally, this TGS model can be narrowed down to the firm level, in that each firm in a particular
industry uses a unique combination of market, legal, and social sanctions to govern transactions.
Expectedly, the ability of a firm to exercise its market power also depends on such attributes as
size and age. Relative to their smaller and younger counterparts, thus, bigger and older firms tend
to rely less on social or legal sanctions to supplement market sanctions in governing business
transactions.
The concept of the multilevel relativity of TGS can be illustrated through the two-dimensional
space in Figure 3.2. In this space, the x-axis captures the degree of reliance on legal sanctions,
and the y-axis, the reliance on social sanctions, as a supplement to market sanctions to govern a
particular transaction (at the society, region, industry, or firm level). Thus, the origin of the space
represents a perfectly efficient market where pure market sanctions alone are enough to govern
all economic activities (or, zero reliance on legal and social sanctions), a hypothetical case that
can hardly be found in modern economies.
The distance between the origin and any point in the space measures the extent to which market
sanctions have failed to govern economic transactions (i.e., the degree to which a society, a
region, an industry, or a firm relies on legal and social sanctions to correct for market
imperfections). This concept can be illustrated through Ray R, upon which any point captures a
particular level of market inefficiency, where a certain combination of social and legal sanctions
can be used as a supplement to market sanctions to regulate the behavior of economic agents.
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Figure 3.2. Relativity of Transaction Governance Structures (TGS)
Accordingly, the oval near the origin (at the lower-left corner of the space) represents those cases
that use mostly market sanctions to govern economic transactions, where only a low level of
reliance on both social and legal sanctions is needed to support a nearly perfect market. In
contrast, the oval at the upper-right corner of the space represents those cases that use almost no
market sanctions to govern economic activities, where extreme market inefficiency calls for a
high level of reliance on both social and legal sanctions to regulate business transactions.
Under a constant level of market inefficiency, social and legal sanctions can be combined in an
infinite number of ways to regulate economic activities. We can link all points that have an equal
distance from the origin of the space to construct an arc (e.g., Arc A), which represents a given
level of market inefficiency. Along Arc A, we have numerous combinations of social and legal
sanctions as a mechanism to correct this level of market inefficiency.
The oval at the upper-left end of Arc A, for example, stands for the use of mostly social sanctions
to correct for market imperfections, which means that legal sanctions are rarely used to deal with
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market inefficiency. The oval at the lower-right end of Arc A, in contrast, represents the use of
mostly legal sanctions to address market imperfections, which means that social sanctions are
barely used to supplement market sanctions. Finally, the oval in the middle of Arc A represents
equal social and legal sanctions, which means that social and legal sanctions are used equally to
alleviate market inefficiency. To construct a TGS space at the society level, therefore, we should
put China at the upper-left corner (i.e., mostly social sanctions), the U.S. at the lower-right
corner (i.e., mostly legal sanctions), and Japan right in the middle (i.e., equal social and legal
sanctions) of the space.

3.1.3. Summary
The above arguments have established the first step of the general framework I proposed in
Chapter 2 in the literature review (illustrated by the lower part in Chapter 2, Figure 2):
transactions are governed by a combination of market, social, and legal sanctions and the degree
of reliance on each of these three mechanisms depends on social and historical factors at the
society, regional, industry, or firm level in each society. This step can be illustrated by Figure 3.3,
where the dotted rectangle represents a transaction governance structure (TGS) that includes
market, social, and legal sanctions.

Market Sanctions

Social Sanctions

Legal Sanctions

Transaction Governance

Figure 3.3. Transaction Governance (Step 1 of the General Model)
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3.2. Social Sanctions and Business Entertainment
The model of TGS relativity depicted above suggests that under the conditions where market and
legal sanctions are weak or ineffective, social sanctions have to play a bigger role to compensate
for the imperfections of market sanctions in regulating economic transactions. Nevertheless, a
key question that remains unanswered in the literature is: how can the power of social sanctions
be reinforced in such cases? I propose below that business entertainment serves as a potential
booster of social sanctions, another major pillar of my theoretical framework.
3.2.1. How social sanctions work
As argued above, social sanctions are one of the supplemental mechanisms used to correct for
the imperfections of market sanctions in regulating transactions. Social sanctions are a social and
psychological process through which social norms are enforced to regulate human behavior.
They support long-term and repeated interpersonal exchanges within communal settings by
deterring economic agents from cheating with the threat that misconduct will incur selfconscious emotional penalties, result in public disproval, and lead to a loss of reputation and/or
profits from future exchanges (Cooter, 1998).
Social sanctions involve both individual emotions and group-level interactions in a community.
The efficacy of social sanctions depends on each individual’s willingness to uphold social norms,
which is featured as a dual-level process. At the individual level, people internalize social norms
to achieve self-improvement, so that violating an established norm makes them feel
psychologically pain (Cooter, 1998). At the group level, based on these internalized norms or
principles, each individual is willing to monitor the behavior of other members in the community
and punish defectors or even those who refuse to punish the violators (Opp, 2001; Posner, 1997).
Increasing the power of social sanctions, first, requires reinforcing personal emotions at the
individual level. Emotions such as social disapproval, distrust, ostracism, peer pressure, feelings
of anxiety, guilt, shame, and public embarrassment of offenders all play key social functions and
the more reinforced these emotions are, the better regulated an individual’s social behavior will
be (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fischer & Manstead, 2008; Fiske, 2005; Noussair & Tucker,
2005). Second, the power of social sanctions also depends on structural dynamics at the group
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level. Within the context of social relations, social interactions can change both human behavior
(Homans, 1974: 58) and social structure (Emerson, 1981). As such, frequent interactions through
communal settings or long-term relationships can build cohesive social structures within which
individuals will be willing to engage in enforcement activities, and thereafter social sanctions
become more powerful in regulating social behavior (Axelrod, 1986; Homans, 1958; Horne,
2007)
3.2.2. Business entertainment
Entertainment in general is an important form of social exchange that can entail feelings of
personal obligations, gratitude, and trust, and create enduring social patterns or structures (Mauss,
1990; Lévi-Strauss, 1957). It has the features of particular and symbolic social exchanges that
can influence individual behavior and social structure (e.g., Blau, 1964; Foa & Foa, 1980). As a
unique type of social exchange, though taking various forms at different stages of history,
entertainment has played important social roles in human life (e.g., Kipnis, 1996; Mauss, 1990).
Since the hunting and gathering stage of human history when food was the most elementary
human need, the functions of eating and drinking, which are typical forms of entertainment
activities, have never been limited to their basics as a physical necessity for survival. Eating
binds people to their faiths through powerful links between food and memory (Sutton, 2001).
Individuals are more receptive to persuasion when eating enjoyable food (Janis, Kay & Kirshner,
1965). As part of the eating process, alcoholic drinking has also played an integrating role in
maintaining social cohesion (Dietler, 2006).
As human society added more sophistication to everyday life, entertainment practices assumed
more important social roles: they are now far removed from merely satisfying subsistence
requirements. For instance, people are often able to exert control over appetite in favor of social
relations during eating (Kipnis, 1996). Entertainment activities have thus started to be used as
rituals and symbols to construct belief systems and to reaffirm and transform relationships
(Mintz & Du Bois, 2002).
The social functions of entertainment can be found in primitive societies and in the history of a
number of civilizations. An important ritual called potlatch (a ceremony accompanied with
banqueting, dancing, and gift exchange) was found among Pacific Islanders, Northwestern
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American Indians, and Asian Eskimos. Potlatch facilitated transactions that exchanged not only
wealth but also actions of politeness; it served as a form of social contract in the absence of the
State’s assumption of that role (Mauss, 1990). For the Mayas, feasting events were used to
“integrate and differentiate group members by providing the public backdrop for the construction
and reproduction of social relations” (LeCount, 2001). For the New Irelanders in the Pacific,
eating was a social institution for maintaining cohesion of the society and of groups within.
Banquets among New Irelanders were used as an occasion for dispute resolution, gift exchange,
sharing jokes and gossip, and arranging business transactions (Powdermaker, 1932). Similar
ritual occasions were observable elsewhere as well. For instance, the Romans used public
banquets to establish and maintain group identities (Donahue, 2003); inscriptions on archaic
bronze vessels recorded details about banquets, rituals, and gift ceremony that were part of the
State life in ancient China.
One common thread of the above observations in different societies is that the material flow in
entertainment practices does not consist of merely concrete and tangible objects; the “items”
flowing are “vehicles and instruments for realities of another order: influence, power, sympathy,
status, and emotion” (Lévi-Strauss, 1957). Entertainment activities have been used as means of
nurturing relationships and strengthening mutual trust, caring, reciprocity, and commitment
(Carrier, 1991; Kipnis, 1996). In business settings, entertainment activities, as a form of social
exchange, play an important role in reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate economic
transactions.

3.2.3. Business entertainment reinforces social sanctions
Just like entertainment in general has played an important role in facilitating human interactions,
business entertainment in particular can create favorable conditions for social sanctions to work
in regulating the behavior of economic agents. Specifically, at the individual level, business
entertainment can promote reciprocal behavior. At the group level, business entertainment helps
to establish and maintain long-term relationships and enhance group dynamics that enable social
sanctions to function more effectively.
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3.2.3.1. Promoting reciprocal behavior
Reciprocity is one of those social norms that are often enforced to generate social sanctions to
regulate interpersonal interactions, including transactional relationships in business settings
(Chen, 2010; Gouldner, 1960). Individuals are often expected to observe the norm of reciprocity
in social and economic exchanges. Failing to do so would engender social sanctions from both
individual and group levels. At the individual level, failing to reciprocate would incur selfimposed emotional penalties like guilt and shame. At the group level, failing to conform to the
principle of reciprocity would subject an individual to social punishments such as peer pressure,
social disapproval, and community ostracism (see Noussair & Tucker, 2005). Those emotional
penalties or social sanctions can force individuals to conform to exchange rules in business
transactions, even if such conformation will result in material losses (Akerlof, 1980). Promoting
reciprocal behavior among individuals, therefore, can boost the power of social sanctions.
Business entertainment serves to promote reciprocal behaviors among individuals. The process
of a business entertainment event, like all other social exchanges, is often accompanied by a flow
of goodwill from the giver to the taker (see Blau [1964], Foa & Foa [1980], and Mauss [1990]
for a discussion on goodwill flow in social exchanges). By accepting entertainment, the taker
also accepts the goodwill that makes him or her feel indebted to the giver. Failing to reciprocate
the giver would force the taker to entail internal emotional penalties and external social sanctions.
Consequently, frequent interactions through business entertainment will increase the taker’s
indebtedness to the giver. The greater the magnitude of indebtedness at the taker’s side, the
stronger the desire to reciprocate the giver by complying with the terms in an expected
transaction (see Greenberg’s [1980] theory on indebtedness and reciprocity). Further, from a
social power perspective, which is about an individual’s socially hierarchical position within a
social stratum (see Burt, 1992), accepting business entertainment from the giver can put the
recipient in a socially subordinated position where he or she is obliged to reciprocate the giver
following the giver’s expectations (see Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974). In addition, accepting
business entertainment without reciprocity will subject the receiver to public reprimand, leaving
him or her with a tainted reputation and hence fewer trading opportunities in the community. By
upholding the norm of reciprocity at the individual and group levels, business entertainment can
potentially boost the power of social sanctions in regulating transactional relationships.
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3.2.3.2. Building long-term relationships
Long-term relationships are conducive for the social sanctions that facilitate transactions. On the
one hand, long-term relationships enable repeated interactions, including repeated economic
transactions, which can foster the cooperative behavior that enhances the power of social
sanctions (see Axelrod, 1984). On the other hand, both the seller and buyer in long-term-based
and repeated transactions expect that cheating and other opportunistic behaviors will be retaliated
in follow-up transactions, which makes social sanctions more effective in deterring
uncooperative behaviors. Establishing and maintaining long-term relationships, therefore, can
create favorable conditions for social sanctions to regulate business transactions.
Business entertainment is an effective means for establishing and maintaining long-term
relationships. First, business entertainment enhances long-term relationships by generating longterm orientations (see Gouldner’s [1960] discussion on relationship building). For example, an
initial treat from a business entertainment giver is often made in the expectation that the recipient
will reciprocate, and in fact it can often induce a treat-back from the recipient. This treat-back in
turn can trigger another reciprocal treat-back from the original giver. The cycle just keeps going
on, in that business entertainment serves not only as a starter but also as a stabilizer in nourishing
a long-term exchange relationship. Expressed differently, business entertainment helps to initiate,
sustain, and reinforce long-term relationships that create a favorable condition for social
sanctions to work in governing repeated transactions (Schwartz, 1967; Simmel, 1950).
Second, business entertainment is an exchange of approximate fairness, just like all other forms
of social exchange (see Schwartz’s [1967] discussion on approximate fairness in social
exchanges). By accepting entertainment, the taker owes a favor to the giver, the quality and
quantity of which is often an approximate amount. What the taker pays back is often believed to
exceed what the giver originally offered, which again puts the original giver (who is now the
taker) in an indebted position. Such imbalance of favor between entertainment giver and taker
will ensure long-term relationships where social sanctions work more effectively in facilitating
transactions.
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3.2.3.3. Enacting group dynamics
Group dynamics is a necessary condition for social sanctions to work because it is only at the
group level that behavioral norms can be established and enforced to generate social sanctions
(see Axelrod, 1984: 129; Horne, 2007). Indeed, group dynamics makes the ritualization of ideas
about proper behaviors more likely and renders deviant behaviors harder to hide (Festinger,
Schachter & Back, 1948).
Group dynamics is the interaction process between an individual and the group he or she belongs
to that can generate the power of social sanctions to regulate individual behaviors. Normally,
individuals are expected to internalize norms autonomously so that sanctions can emerge from
within the individual. However, more often than not individuals fail to observe norms voluntarily;
therefore, external deterrence at the group level is needed to force individuals to internalize
norms. In cases where such group-level deterrence fails to force an individual to internalize and
comply with norms, third-party social pressure at the group level is also needed to force the
individual to abide by norms. As such, group dynamics is a critical condition for social sanctions
to work more effectively.
As a social activity that is often practiced at the group level, business entertainment can enact
group dynamics to make social sanctions more effective in facilitating transactions. Business
entertainment is usually attached to a business purpose. When a guest manager accepts an
invitation and takes business entertainment from the host manager, she is expected to cooperate
on, or at least be more receptive toward, the accompanied business transaction, based solely on
the norm of reciprocity. On the one hand, the co-presence of multiple participants in the
entertainment event would expose her to the deterrence of group-level sanctions that could force
her to internalize norms and comply. On the other hand, when such deterrence still does not work,
those participants would punish the defaulter by spreading her bad reputation in the business
circle that could exert real collective sanctions upon the defaulter at the group level. As a result,
the defaulter will be ostracized from the business circle and incur future economic losses. As
such, business entertainment enacts group dynamics that makes social sanctions work more
effectively in facilitating transactional relationships.
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3.2.4. Summary
The above arguments have established the second step of the general framework I proposed in
Chapter 2 (illustrated by the vertical part in Figure 2.2): business entertainment boosts the power
of social sanctions in governing transactions, particularly under the conditions where social
sanctions play a bigger role in a TGS (i.e., market and legal sanctions are weak). This step can be
illustrated by Figure 3.4, where business entertainment contributes to transaction governance
through boosting the power of social sanctions.
Business Entertainment

Reciprocal Behavior

Long-term Orientation

Group Dynamics

Social Sanctions

Transaction Governance

Figure 3.4. Business Entertainment, Social Sanctions, & Transaction Governance
(Step 2 of the General Model)

3.3. An Integrated New Model
Up to now, I have set up an integrated model where business entertainment plays a role in
boosting the power of social sanctions as a supplement to market and legal sanctions to govern
economic transactions. Integrating Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4, I portray this transaction
governance model of business entertainment through Figure 3.5, where all transactions are
governed through a combination of market, legal, and social sanctions. I have called such a
combination the transaction governance structure (TGS), which is symbolized by the dotted
rectangle.
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Figure 3.5. The Integrated General Model of Transaction Governance Structure &
Business Entertainment

I have argued further that business entertainment serves as a significant amplifier of social
sanctions in alleviating market imperfections, especially in societies where market and legal
infrastructures are underdeveloped. More specifically, I have focused on business
entertainment’s role in promoting reciprocal behavior at the individual level, in establishing and
maintaining long-term relationships in dyadic interactions, and in enhancing group dynamics
within communal settings, which are all conducive to the effective working of social sanctions,
and hence to the regulation of individual behavior and the governance of transactions. As such,
an association between social sanctions and business entertainment has been established.

3.4. Summary
To sum up, economic transactions are governed through a TGS that features a combination of
market, legal, and social sanctions. Cultural, social, and institutional factors shape relatively
different transaction governance structures across societies. Such variations can also be observed
at the regional, industry, and firm levels. Within a TGS, social sanctions play a bigger role in
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governing transactions when both market and legal sanctions are weak. Social sanctions play
such a role through a social psychological process where social norms are enforced to regulate
the behavior of individuals.
Business entertainment fits into the TGS by creating favorable conditions for social sanctions to
work in regulating the behavior of economic agents. At the individual level, business
entertainment can promote reciprocal behavior. At the group level, business entertainment helps
to establish and maintain long-term relationships and to enact group dynamics that enable social
sanctions to function more effectively.
Building upon the framework of the relativity of TGS and the proposition that business
entertainment reinforces social sanctions to facilitate transactions, I make two predictions. First,
under the conditions where social sanctions play a bigger role in transaction governance,
business entertainment will be more intensively practiced; and second, business entertainment
should be more effective when it induces stronger reciprocal behavior and long-term orientation
and enacts stronger group dynamics. In the next two chapters, I use China as an empirical
context to verify my general model. Chapter 4 tests the pervasiveness of business entertainment
with a sample of Chinese manufacturers listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE), and
Chapter 5 tests the effectiveness of business entertainment with survey data collected among
Chinese sales managers.
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Chapter 4
4. Predicting the Pervasiveness of Business Entertainment at the
Firm Level
Building upon the general framework of transaction governance structure (TGS) and the
proposition that business entertainment has the potential to boost the power of social sanctions in
regulating the behavior of economic agents, this chapter uses China as an empirical contest to
develop hypotheses and runs empirical tests to verify the firm-level pervasiveness of business
entertainment. The basic argument is that companies will spend more on business entertainment
in situations where social sanctions play a greater role in governing economic transactions,
namely, the situations where market and legal infrastructures are less developed. The empirical
data needed for the tests were collected from a sample of manufacturers listed on the Shanghai
Stock Exchange (SSE) in China.

4.1. Hypotheses
The general model I have proposed in this dissertation is that social and legal sanctions can be
used as remedies for market imperfections and that business entertainment boosts the power of
social sanctions for the sanctions to function more effectively. I use a set of society-level factors
to predict firms’ reliance on social sanctions (vs. legal sanctions) as remedies for market
imperfections in governing transactional relationships, and hence to predict their spending on
business entertainment.
4.1.1. Social sanction conduciveness
Social sanctions work more effectively as a remedy for market imperfections when the norm of
reciprocity is well-established in a society, business transactions are long-term in nature, and the
parties involved transact in a communal setting. Social sanction conduciveness denotes whether
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or not a society meets these conditions.
According to my base TGS model (see Chapter 3, Figure 3.5), market, social, and legal sanctions
constitute a transaction governance structure in regulating exchange relationships. In a social
context that is conducive to social sanctions, social sanctions must be more effective and will
therefore be used more widely in regulating transactions. In such a case, as illustrated by Figure
4.1 (a), business entertainment will be practiced more intensively to boost the power of social
sanctions in transaction governance (as compared to the base model shown in Figure 3.5).

Business Entertainment

Market Sanctions

Social Sanctions

Legal Sanctions

Transaction Governance

Figure 4.1. (a): Relativity of TGS & Pervasiveness of Business Entertainment: Social
Sanction Conduciveness
Let me take China as an example of the model in Figure 4.1. China has been historically an
agrarian society where indigenous people live in a community-based life pattern. The communal
setting is conducive to norm development, which makes close monitoring and group sanctioning
of individual behaviors possible. Given China’s collectivist cultural heritages (see Hofstede,
1980), most interpersonal relationships are oriented to the long term, including business
relationships. As well, the Chinese society has developed elaborate norms, particularly the norm
of reciprocity, which is an important norm for governing interpersonal relationships (see Axelrod,
1984). Famous ritual principles in China include, for instance, “receiving without reciprocating
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is not ritually proper behavior” and “the receipt of a droplet of generosity should be repaid with a
gushing spring.” Such principles are all about the norm of reciprocity, which works better in
governing transactional relationships that are long-term in nature. The above three conditions
(communal setting, long-term orientation, and reciprocity) foster a conducive context for social
sanctions to work in regulating the behavior of economic agents, which allows China to rely
more on social sanctions to regulate exchange relationships. Under the three conditions, as
shown in Figure 4.1, business entertainment is practiced more intensively to boost the power of
social sanctions in transaction governance.
Economic reform in the past three decades, however, has brought about gigantic social changes
in China. To begin with, urbanization and increased human mobility resulting from economic
development have rent the traditional social fabrics that are necessary for effective functioning of
social sanctions. Also, rapid development has generated economic systems that are too
complicated for social sanctions to regulate. More important, frequent interactions with the
outside world, particularly with the Western societies, have exposed some local communities to
mimetic and normative pressures that have led to institutional assimilation with the West, such as
the adoption of legal sanctions as a remedy to market imperfections (see DiMaggio & Powell,
1991).
Such changes, nonetheless, have happened unevenly across the country, given the nature of the
gradual geographic commitment of the country’s reform. For instance, the coastal areas have
experienced intensive changes which distorted the social context needed for social sanctions to
function effectively; the inland areas, in contrast, still feature a traditional social context that is
more conducive to social sanctions, where business entertainment serves to boost the power of
social sanctions in regulating transactional relationships. As such, I predict that:
Hypothesis 1: Chinese firms operating in a context that is conducive for social sanctions to
work will spend more on business entertainment to facilitate exchange relationships than
others operating in a context that is not conducive to the working of social sanctions.

4.1.2. Legal infrastructure development
In addition to social sanctions, legal sanctions are another remedy for the failure of market
sanctions. Given a certain level of market inefficiency, social and legal sanctions can be used in
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numerous combinations to supplement market sanctions in governing transactions. Thus, the
reliance on social vs. legal sanctions to regulate the behavior of economic agents depends on the
relative availability and effectiveness of the two substitute mechanisms. As illustrated by Figure
4.1 (b), social sanctions will be used more often if legal infrastructures are less developed (that is,
legal sanctions are rarely used to support economic transactions). When social sanctions play a
greater role in transaction governance, business entertainment will be more widely practiced to
boost the power of social sanctions in playing this role (as compared to the base model shown in
Chapter 3, Figure 3.5).

Business Entertainment

Market Sanctions

Social Sanctions

Legal Sanctions

Transaction Governance
Figure 4.1. (b): Relativity of TGS & Pervasiveness of Business Entertainment:
Under-Developed Legal Infrastructure
Let me use China as an example. The traditional Chinese economy has been characterized as a
family-based business model that did not evolve into complex economic systems supported by
formal legal institutions (see Portes & Haller, 2005). In addition, intertwined personal and
business relationships in this collectivist society have made impartial enforcement of laws
difficult, if possible at all. Throughout her history, China has been epitomized as having a weak
legal system. This system can also be attributed to the Confucian values that advocate rule by
norms and rituals instead of rule of law (Appelbaum, 1998; Balazs, 1965). After the last imperial
dynasty fell in 1911, neither the nationalists nor the communists made much progress to replace
this traditional rule by norms by establishing an efficient legal system (Potter, 2002). Although
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the country has continued its efforts to develop modern legal infrastructures, legal sanctions are
still missing in many aspects of the economic life in China.
In the past thirty years, however, the reform policies in China have fostered institutional changes
that are characterized as the adoption of legal sanctions in transaction governance. Nonetheless,
such changes happened largely in selected areas, e.g., in big cities and the coastal regions. In
many inland areas, however, legal services are not widely available and the traditional rule by
norms has remained a key supplement for market sanctions in regulating the behavior of
economic agents. Given the absence of well-developed legal infrastructures in such areas to
address market inefficiency, social sanctions will serve as the main remedy for market
inefficiency, and hence business entertainment will be used more intensively to boost the power
of social sanctions in governing economic transactions.
As such, I predict that Chinese firms operating in those regions with less developed legal
infrastructures will use business entertainment more often to facilitate exchange relationships (vs.
their counterparts operating in regions with better developed legal infrastructures).
Hypothesis 2: Under a given level of market inefficiency, Chinese firms in regions with
less developed legal infrastructures will spend more on business entertainment to facilitate
transactional relationships than others in regions with better-developed legal infrastructures.

4.1.3. Market efficiency
The above arguments are framed on the assumption that social and legal sanctions are used as
remedies for a constant level of imperfections of market sanctions. In reality, however, the
efficiency level of market sanctions varies under different situations, which may affect the extent
to which social sanctions are needed for transaction governance, and thereby the extent to which
business entertainment is used to boost the governance power of social sanctions.
When market sanctions are too weak to uphold transactions, more nonmarket institutions (i.e.,
legal and social sanctions) have to be used to regulate transactions. As illustrated in Figure 4.1
(c), with the development level of legal infrastructures being kept constant, social sanctions must
play a bigger role to govern exchange relationships supported by weak market sanctions (or
transactions conducted in a less efficient market). Accordingly, more business entertainment will
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be needed to boost the governance power of social sanctions in a less efficient market (as
compared to the base model shown in Figure 3.5).
China is well-known as a society inflicted with market imperfections. In Chinese history, the
Confucian teachings supported agriculture and suppressed commerce. This traditional cultural
value was well reflected in official policies through dynasties and had led China to the trajectory
of an agrarian society featuring a natural economy of autarky, where land, labor, and capital had
all failed to become commodities. The Confucian tradition, indeed, is considered the main cause
for the absence of a market economy in Chinese history (Hamilton, 2006a).

Business Entertainment

Market Sanctions

Social Sanctions

Legal Sanctions

Transaction Governance

Figure 4.1. (c): Relativity of TGS & Pervasiveness of Business Entertainment:
Inefficient Market
In the past thirty years, uneven economic development has changed the business landscape in
China and made the picture more complicated. As a result of the “open-door” policy
implemented in China, those coastal provinces hosting special economic zones, for instance,
have been exposed to industrialized economies and urbanized societies in the West (e.g., Japan
and the U.S.) and developed a modern economic system featuring stronger market sanctions. In
contrast, many inland areas still maintain to a greater extent the traditional agrarian and less
mature economic systems that rely heavily on social sanctions. For example, the coastal areas
generate intensive exports and imports (e.g., long-distance trade) that are found in modern
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market economies, but the inland areas still run local or regional trade found mainly in less
developed economies.
Hence, I propose that Chinese firms operating in regions where market infrastructures are less
developed will use business entertainment more intensively to boost the power of social
sanctions in regulating exchange relationships than their counterparts operating in regions where
market infrastructures are better developed (and hence where social sanctions play a smaller role
in regulating economic activities).
Hypothesis 3: Chinese firms located in regions with inefficient market infrastructures
will spend more on business entertainment to govern exchange relationships than firms
located in regions with efficient market infrastructures.

4.2. Empirical Tests
4.2.1. Sample and data collection
I tested the above hypotheses on a sample of manufacturers listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange in China (Shanghai Stock Exchange Statistics Annual, 2009). For three reasons I
believe that this empirical setting is ideal for verifying the transaction governance approach to
business entertainment. First, as pointed out earlier, China still has a relatively immature market
system featuring the Confucian heritage of rule by norms rather than rule of law. Second,
economic reforms in past decades have led to developmental disparities in China and variations
in transaction governance mechanisms are evident across different regions of the country. Third,
the sample provides perfect control for other country-level factors that also affect the prevalence
of business entertainment (e.g., national cultures or political systems).
Among the firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange I used only those manufacturing firms
that included the accounting item “entertainment expenses” in their financial reports. I focus on
the manufacturing sector to control for the idiosyncrasy of the service sector and reflect the
dominant role of China as the production plant in the world. According to the general accounting
principles in China, firms must record all entertainment expenses in their financial accounts and
failing to do so will draw penalties from the taxation authorities (State Administration of

67

Taxation, 2006). In practice, however, not all firms include entertainment expenses in their
annual reports, and I included in the sample only those that had chosen to do so. Previous studies
have found that financial data reported by public firms in the Shanghai Stock Exchange are
reasonably reliable (e.g., Allen, Qian & Qian, 2005; Chen, 2004).
A major possible concern was that the firms’ decision to exclude or include the item of
entertainment expenses in financial reports might cause selection bias to this study. To make
sure that this selection bias does not exist in my sample, I compared sample means on key
variables between the two groups of firms (one including and the other excluding entertainment
expenses). The comparison yielded no significant differences between the two groups. Overall,
the sample firms are highly representative of all SSE firms on the majority of the variables. For
instance, these firms span 28 out of China’s 31 regions at the province level, representing all 16
three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) sub-sectors of manufacturers, with an average
state ownership of 30.71 percent, which is close to the SSE average of 31.84 percent (Shanghai
Stock Exchange Factbook, 2008).
I collected data backward from 2007 to 2003 (i.e., a five-year window). A number of reasons
have convinced me that financial data collected in this period are particularly suitable for my
analysis. In 2003, the Chinese economy had cooled down from an overheating in the 1990s with
a successful soft-landing. Also, it had largely absorbed the shocks from the 1997 Asian financial
crisis and the burst of the Internet bubble in the early 2000s. Further, this sampling period
preceded the recent global recession that began in 2008. It is safe to say that during this five-year
period, Chinese firms were experiencing relatively stable and smooth growth. In addition, the
consumer price index in China was steady (around 1%) and thus adjustments to data due to
inflation were not necessary.
This sampling procedure yielded a list of 139 firms and a panel of 695 firm-year observations
over the period between 2003 and 2007.

4.2.2. The Model

I have argued that business entertainment serves to reinforce social sanctions to facilitate
transactions, particularly under the conditions where social sanctions are more effective and play
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a bigger role (i.e., market and legal infrastructures are underdeveloped). Hence, Chinese
manufacturers will spend more on business entertainment when they operate in environments
that are more conducive for social sanctions to work, and where weak legal and market sanctions
call for more social sanctions to govern transactions. These hypotheses were tested through a
time-series, cross-section model as specified below:
Yit = α + β1Χ1it + β2Χ2it + Eit
where Yit is the dependent variable (i.e., business entertainment spending); Χ1it a vector of
independent variables; Χ2it a vector of control variables, α the intercept, β1 and β2 are vectors of
parameters for the ith firm in year t, and Eit is the error term.
As mentioned earlier, I used a firm’s total annual spending on entertainment-related activities as
the dependent variable. I used real spending, rather than an intensity ratio of business
entertainment spending to sales, to avoid information loss. According to the general accounting
principles in China, expenses on activities that take place in venues ranging from hotels,
restaurants, golf courses, karaoke booths, and dance halls, to bowling lanes, sauna rooms, hair
salons, and massage parlors are considered business entertainment spending.
In testing the governance role of business entertainment, I assume that the sample firms make
rational decisions on entertainment spending that can help them facilitate business transactions. I
also assume that they self-select the optimal form of entertainment activities to maximize the
governance effect. Entertainment spending may be toward suppliers, buyers, or even government
regulators, but all types and forms of entertainment activities play the same role of reinforcing
social sanctions to facilitate transactional relationships that are weakly supported by legal and
market sanctions. It is not necessary, or even empirically possible, to classify those entertainment
activities. Overall, I believe that this accounting item is an accurate and reliable proxy for
business entertainment spending at the firm level.

4.2.3. Independent Variables
On the right-hand side of the equation is a vector of independent variables that I used to predict
Chinese firms’ spending on business entertainment and thereby to test the hypotheses developed
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earlier.

4.2.3.1. Social sanction conduciveness
As defined earlier, social sanction conduciveness denotes whether in a particular region the norm
of reciprocity is well-established, whether long-term orientation is featured in the social culture,
and whether there exists a strong communal setting that enables frequent social interactions.
There are two factors that can potentially change social sanction conduciveness of a particular
region and hence serve as its measures. First, urbanization can rupture the traditional social
fabrics that are necessary for the effective functioning of social sanctions. Second, frequent
interactions with the developed societies, particularly international trade, can expose local
communities to mimetic and normative pressures that could lead to institutional assimilation with
the West (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991). Both factors can change the social context in a way that
makes reciprocity and long-term orientation less of a binding behavioral norm and enables
individuals to break out from their communal norms in dealing with strangers. Such changes
could make the social setting less conducive to the working of social sanctions. As such, I used
urbanization and international trade in the home province of the focal firm to measure social
sanction conduciveness. As suggested by Hypothesis 1, I expected this variable to carry a
negative coefficient.
4.2.3.2. Legal infrastructure development
The number of attorneys in a particular region in China was used in prior studies to measure the
availability of legal services in the region (e.g., Gao, Murray, Kotabe & Lu, 2010). I used two
factors to measure legal infrastructure development: one is the number of attorneys per 100,000
population, and the other is the number of filed lawsuits per 100,000 of population in the home
province of a firm (Chinese Yearbook of Lawyers 2004). Because of the high correlation between
these two measures, I used the factor analysis method to construct an index to evaluate the
development level of legal infrastructures. I believe this index can reflect the availability of legal
services and thus proxy for the legal infrastructures in a region. According to Hypothesis 2, I
expected this legal index to carry a negative coefficient.
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4.2.3.3. Market efficiency
A number of studies have used the index of free market mechanism development, which was
compiled by the National Economic Research Institute (NERI) of China, to test the variation in
market efficiency across Chinese provinces (e.g., Gao et al., 2010; Li, Meng & Zhang, 2006). I
used the same index to measure market efficiency in this study. This index captures two subindices: the percentage of products with market-determined prices; and the reduction of local
protectionism that affects a firm’s ability to decide where and at what price to sell their products.
As predicted in Hypothesis 3, I expected this measure to carry a negative sign.

4.2.4. Control Variables
My theory is focused on the social, legal, and market factors at the regional level. Therefore,
there is the need to control for other regional factors, along with industry and firm level factors,
to isolate out the main effects. Those factors are described as follows.
Firm annual sales. I used a firm’s total annual sales to control for the scale effect, expecting this
variable to carry a positive sign (i.e., firms that generate more sales also spend more on business
entertainment).
Firm age. I controlled for firm age, expecting that older firms may have a larger business
network to maintain and therefore must spend more on business entertainment, which indicates a
positive impact of firm age on entertainment expenses.
Firm employee number. The number of employees in a firm may have two conflicting effects on
business entertainment. On the one hand, firms with more employees often feature stronger
bureaucratic control and corporate governance that can effectively prevent managers from using
business entertainment excessively. On the other hand, agency problems (see Jensen & Meckling,
1976) may be more severe in firms with more employees, which means that managers in firms
with more employees will spend more towards their private benefits in the name of business
entertainment (e.g., Cai, Fang & Xu, 2005; Rajan & Wulf, 2004). Hence, the impact of employee
number on business entertainment is an empirical question to be answered later by the results.
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State ownership. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China may have more legal power and
hence use less business entertainment to boost the governance power of social sanctions. I used
the percentage of the stake controlled by the state in a firm to measure its ownership structure. I
expected this variable to have a negative impact on a firm’s spending on business entertainment.
GDP per capita. At the regional level, we used provincial GDP per capita to control for
disparities of economic development that may affect firms’ business entertainment spending. I
expected this variable to carry a positive sign, based on the fact that the affluence level in
different regions can affect the scale and varieties of entertainment activities and hence the
amount of entertainment spending (i.e., a firm’s entertainment spending tends to be larger if it is
located in a more affluent region).
Industry control. Although the sample covers only manufacturing firms, it still spans 16
industries at the three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) level (from 311 to 339). To
control for any unaccounted industry effects, I also included 15 zero-vs.-one dummy variables in
my model to represent the 16 three-digit SIC industries, using food products (SIC 311) as the
base industry.
The statistics of all variables and the correlation matrix are given in Table 4.1. The variance
inflation factors (VIFs) generated from ordinary least square (OLS) tests are well below the
critical threshold of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern in the dataset (e.g., the
largest VIF is 2.57). A test on distribution found that sample distribution is good.

4.3. Results
My analyses are based on a cross-section, time-series panel that has the advantages of increasing
sample size and of capturing both the individual effects from each section and the dynamic
effects from the sample (Kmenta, 1996). However, pooling repeated entries of the same
observations may lead to within-unit autocorrelation and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. As a
result, using an OLS model may create biased variance estimates that hamper hypothesis testing
(Greene, 2003). To correct for the potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity issues, I
follow the advice of Sayrs (1989) by using a generalized least square (GLS) approach.
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Through the Wooldridge Test (see Drukker, 2003), I found that autocorrelation is not a concern
in my dataset (F = 0.79 and p < .38). Through the Breusch-Pagan Test introduced by Baltagi and
Raj (1992), I found that heteroskedasticity is present in the panel (Chi-Square = 2,310 and p
< .001). Thus, I applied a Feasible Generalized Least Square (FGLS) method that fits a dataset
with heteroskedasticity but without autocorrelation (Greene, 2003).
The results of the FGLS regression are reported in Table 4.2. On top of industry controls (which
I will report later), I entered into Model 1 only the five other control variables (i.e., GDP per
capita, total sales, firm age, total employees, and state ownership) to capture the effects of
regional economic and firm level variables on firms’ entertainment spending. As predicted, both
GDP per capita and total sales carry a positive coefficient that is significant at the 0.001 level;
firm age is significant at the 0.05 level; and state ownership carries a negative sign that is
significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient of total employees is positive but not significant.
One explanation for the insignificant effect of the employee number is that business
entertainment is often used to facilitate exchange relationships, which is a marketing/sales
function that cannot be fully reflected through the large number of assembly workers in a sample
that covers only manufacturing firms.
In Model 2, I added another pair of variables, i.e., international trade and urbanization, to
capture the effect of social sanction conduciveness on entertainment spending. As expected, the
variable international trade carries a negative sign that is significant at the 0.001 level. To my
surprise, the coefficient of urbanization is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level,
contradicting my prediction. The combined results lend partial support for Hypothesis 1, which
predicts that a social context that is more (less) conducive to the working of social sanctions will
have a positive (negative) effect on the pervasiveness of business entertainment.
I have two explanations for the positive impact of urbanization on the prevalence of business
entertainment. First, urbanization enables more varieties of modern entertainment formats that
potentially increase the scale of entertainment spending. For instance, people in urban areas can
consume lavishly in luxurious restaurants to which rural dwellers don’t have immediate access.
Second, urban life allows people to have closer physical proximity, which provides the
convenience for entertainment activities. These two factors can potentially boost entertainment
spending, and hence they are all positively correlated with the dependent variable, which is
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Table 4.1. Minimums, Maximums, Means, Standard Deviations & Correlationsª
Minimum

Maximum

Mean

S. D.

1

1. Pervasiveness

.12

128.33

5.96

8.62

2. GDP per capita

3,838

78,801

31,449

17,159

.13***

3. Annual sales

19.68

76,180

2,530

5,395

.54***

.07*

4. Firm age

3

24

8.56

3.53

.05

.16***

–.02

5. Total employees

56

94,269

4,406

9,011

.31***

.08*

.64***

–.05

6. State ownership

.44

.69

.31

.21

.02

.00

.17***

–.25***

.19***

7. International trade

.00

1271

54.89

258

.00

.32***

–.01

.14***

–.02

–.06*

8. Urbanization

.02

1.00

.38

.25

.13***

.58***

.06*

.03

.08*

–.00

.37***

9. Legal index

13.15

504.55

151.88

134.61

.15***

.56***

.10**

.03

.15***

.14***

.30***

.52***

10. Market index

3.84

10.40

7.49

1.79

.06*

.58***

–.01

.22***

–.05

–.06*

.34***

.15***

1. ªn = 695.
2. * P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 (2 tailed p-value).
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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

.54***

Table 4.2. FGLS Results for Pervasiveness of Business Entertainment
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

GDP per capita

3.17E – 05***
(5.19E – 06)

9.42E – 06
(7.47E – 06)

7.53E – 06
(7.42E – 06)

1.65E – 05*
(7.53E – 06)

Total sales

9.34E – 04***
(5.97E – 05)

9.19E – 04***
(6.03E – 05)

9.33E – 04***
(6.08E – 05)

9.38E – 04***
(6.18E – 05)

.05*
(.02)

.07**
(.02)

. 06*
(.02)

.08**
(.02)

Total employees

1.62E – 05
(2.97E – 05)

6.60E – 06
(2.90E – 05)

–2.22E – 06
(2.98E – 05)

1.45E – 05
(3.59E – 05)

State ownership

–.02 **
(5.82E – 03)

–.02***
(5.18E – 03)

–.01**
(5.20E – 03)

–.02 **
(5.80E – 03)

–2.31E – 03***
(4.68E – 04)

–2.61E – 03***
(4.62E – 04)

–2.63E – 03***
(4.77E – 04)

.04**
(.01)

.08***
(.01)

.10***
(.02)

–5.99E – 03***
(2.18E – 03)

–8.17E – 03**
(2.51E – 03)

Control variables

Firm age

Industry control (see Table 4.3)
Social sanctions conduciveness
International trade
Urbanization
Legal infrastructure development
Legal index
Market efficiency
–.23**
(.08)

Market index
1.
2.
3.

† P < .10; * P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 (2 tailed p-value).
n = 695.
Enclosed in parentheses are standard errors.

business entertainment spending. They help to explain why urbanization bears a positive
coefficient, instead of a negative one as predicted in Hypothesis 1.
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In Model 3, I added the variable legal index that captures the development level of legal
infrastructures in each province to predict the pervasiveness of business entertainment. The
variable bears a negative coefficient that is significant at the 0.01 level. The finding confirms
Hypothesis 2, where I predicted that firms located in provinces with better developed legal
infrastructures spend less on business entertainment than their counterparts located in provinces
with less developed legal infrastructures.
Model 4 is the full analysis that also considers the impact of market efficiency on the
pervasiveness of business entertainment. I used the market index to capture a firm’s home
province’s level of market efficiency. This variable carries a negative coefficient that is
significant at the 0.01 level, supporting Hypothesis 3 that firms located in regions with a less
efficient market system spend more on entertainment activities than firms located in regions with
a more efficient market system.
The results of all industry dummies are reported in Table 4.3. When the model covers only
industry dummies (Column 1), it has a Wald Chi-Square of 391.66 that is significant at the 0.001
level, confirming the existence of unaccounted industry effects on the pervasiveness of business
entertainment. In fact, my data revealed substantial variations in entertainment spending across
sectors, ranging from RMB 8.06 million in beverages/tobacco to RMB 4.51 million in
plastics/rubber products. In the full model that covers all independent variables (Column 6), the
Wald Chi-Square is 981.00 (p < .001), which again indicates consistent model fit.

4.4. Summary
In this chapter, I developed a set of hypotheses to verify why the intensity of business
entertainment practice varies between firms, based on the model of relativity of TGS across
multiple levels. Empirical tests were conducted on a sample of manufacturers listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange. The results indicate that entertainment spending among the firms in
the sample is significantly related to those society-level factors that affect the use of social
sanctions as a supplement for market and legal sanctions in governing transactional relationships.
These results provide evidence supporting my transaction governance approach to business
entertainment.
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Table 4.3. FGLS Results from Industry Controls

Industry
control

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Independent and other control variables (See Table 4.2)
Beverage and tobacco
products

–8.06***
(1.26)

–3.60**
(1.34)

–5.51***
(1.19)

–5.43***
(1.17)

–5.27***
(1.15)

Textile mills

–8.05***
(1.29)

–3.56**
(1.36)

–5.30***
(1.21)

–5.16***
(1.19)

–5.01***
(1.17)

Apparel

–6.61***
(1.31)

–3.58**
(1.37)

–4.89***
(1.26)

–4.97***
(1.24)

–5.25***
(1.20)

Wood products

–6.46***
(1.43)

–1.50
(1.46)

–4.32**
(1.35)

–4.76***
(1.34)

–4.24**
(1.33)

–6.33***
(1.33)
–5.67***
(1.28)

–1.90
(1.40)
–1.24
(1.34)

–3.87**
(1.24)
–3.44**
(1.18)

–3.73**
(1.23)
–3.37***
(1.17)

–3.41**
(1.21)
–3.40**
(1.14)

Plastics and rubber

–4.51**
(1.56)

–2.12
(1.43)

–3.42**
(1.28)

–2.56
(1.31)

–2.26
(1.31)

Nonmetallic mineral

–7.62***
(1.28)

–3.20*
(1.34)

–5.02***
(1.19)

–4.91***
(1.17)

–4.99***
(1.15)

Primary metals

–4.88***
(1.26)

–6.72***
(1.35)

–8.38***
(1.22)

–8.21***
(1.21)

–8.32***
(1.17)

Fabricated metals

–5.28***
(1.38)

–2.44
(1.35)

–3.96**
(1.21)

–3.89**
(1.19)

–3.55**
(1.17)

Machinery

–6.23***
(1.36)

–2.72
(1.42)

–4.51***
(1.26)

–4.40***
(1.25)

–4.34***
(1.21)

Computers and
electronic products

–6.26***
(1.28)

–3.00*
(1.35)

–4.63***
(1.20)

–4.52***
(1.19)

–4.23**
(1.16)

Electrical equipment

–4.94***
(1.31)

–2.09
(1.35)

–4.27**
(1.23)

–4.07**
(1.22)

–3.86**
(1.19)

Transportation
equipment

–5.03***
(1.27)

–1.34
(1.34)

–3.06**
(1.17)

–3.12**
(1.16)

–3.25*
(1.13)

Miscellaneous
products

–3.47
(1.96)

–.42
(2.00)

–3.18
(1.94)

–2.63
(1.95)

–2.47
(1.95)

Constant

10.85***
(1.25)

4.62**
(1.39)

5.23***
(1.29)

3.74**
(1.35)

4.10**
(1.35)

Wald statistics

391.66***

927.92***

835.78***

899.33***

981.00***

Paper products
Basic chemicals

1. *P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 (two tailed p-value).
2. n = 695.
3. Enclosed in parentheses are standard errors.
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Chapter 5
5. Effectiveness of Business Entertainment: A Transaction-Level
Test
Chapter 3 argues that business entertainment reinforces the power of social sanctions in
regulating the behavior of economic agents when market sanctions and legal sanctions have both
failed to do so effectively. In this chapter, I use China as an empirical context to examine the
effectiveness of business entertainment in playing that role, using a set of survey data collected
from a sample of Chinese sales managers.

5.1. Hypotheses Development
The previous chapters have argued that each society features a unique combination of market,
legal, and social sanctions in transaction governance, and that business entertainment has the
potential to reinforce the power of social sanctions, particularly under the conditions where
market and legal sanctions are weak and social sanctions play a bigger role in transaction
governance. Specifically, at the individual level, business entertainment can induce reciprocal
behavior, which also fosters long-term and group orientation. At the group level, business
entertainment helps to establish and maintain long-term relationships and to enact group
dynamics that enable social sanctions to function more effectively. As such, the effectiveness of
business entertainment in boosting the power of social sanctions to facilitate transactional
relationships is determined by the magnitude of the reciprocal behavior it can trigger, the degree
of the long-term orientation it can promote, and the strength of the group dynamics it can help to
enact. In other words, increasing the magnitude of Chinese managers’ reciprocal behavior,
promoting long-term orientation, and enacting group dynamics should also increase the
effectiveness of business entertainment in boosting the power of social sanctions to facilitate
transactional relationships.
I identified a set of features of business entertainment and propose that they could potentially
influence the effectiveness of business entertainment in reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate
exchange relationships. Specifically, I hypothesize that the dollar amount of entertainment
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spending, the frequency of entertainment practice, and intimate and observable entertainment
activities all have an impact on the effectiveness of business entertainment.

5.1.1. Amount of business entertainment expenses
I first argue that the dollar amount of business entertainment spending has an impact on its
effectiveness in helping a Chinese manager to trigger, and increase the magnitude of, reciprocal
behavior from his or her guest. In business settings, when a guest manager accepts entertainment
from the host manager, the guest will feel indebted to the host and obliged to reciprocate the host
with an expected transaction based solely on the rule of reciprocity. The larger the amount spent
on business entertainment by the host, the stronger the guest’s feelings of indebtedness and
hence the desire to reciprocate the host.
The above argument can find support from both individual behavioral and social structural
dimensions. First, from an individual behavioral perspective, which is pertinent to an
individual’s internal self-emotional reactions to external stimuli (see Homans, 1958), increasing
the amount of business entertainment expenses can strengthen the guest manager’s feelings of
indebtedness to the host manager and therefore engender the obligation to reciprocate the host
manager. In China, people rarely split expenses on eating, drinking, or entertainment activities.
There is usually a clear distinction between the host and the guest in such events and the host
often pays the entire bill. This is particularly true when one manager entertains another manager
in business settings. In such a setting, the host manager pays the bill and therefore transfers a
favor of both material value and goodwill to the guest. Based on the Chinese ritual principle that
“receiving without reciprocating is not ritually proper behavior” (The Book of Ritual: Qulishang,
1970), in most cases the process can trigger feelings of indebtedness at the guest side and induce
the guest to reciprocate. The larger the amount of entertainment expenses, the greater the
magnitude of such a mood of indebtedness, and hence the higher degree of discomfort and the
stronger desire to reduce it through reciprocity (see Greenberg [1980] for a discussion of
indebtedness and reciprocity).
Second, from a social structural perspective, which is about an individual’s socially hierarchical
position within a social stratum he or she belongs in (see Burt, 1992), increasing the dollar
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amount of business entertainment expenses can put the guest manager in a more socially
subordinated position where the guest manager is obliged to obey the host manager following her
expectations (see Blau, 1964; Homans, 1974). Based on a traditional Chinese norm on the
interaction mechanisms in personal relationships, once a guest manager receives a treat of
entertainment from the host manager, the “mouth becomes soft” and the “hands become short,”
which means that he or she becomes socially subordinated and sentimentally obliged to the host
manager (see Yang, 1994: 197). Consequently, the relationship between the two becomes closer
after each entertainment. A Chinese ritual principle also holds that the receipt of a droplet of
generosity should be repaid with a gushing spring, which indicates that a guest manager who has
received an entertainment treat from a host manager must pay back in excess of the original offer
the guest received. Increasing the expenses of business entertainment thus triggers stronger
reciprocal and cooperative behavior at the guest manager’s side and more effectively convinces
the guest to reciprocate the host manager by abiding by exchange terms and maintaining a longterm orientation on the business relationship. As such, I propose that:
Hypothesis 1: The dollar amount of business entertainment expenses is positively
associated with business entertainment’s effectiveness in facilitating transactional
relationships.
5.1.2. Frequency of business entertainment practices
The frequency of business entertainment practice can affect its effectiveness as well. Business
entertainment is accompanied with an emotional flow (i.e., goodwill) from the giver to the taker
that can trigger reciprocal goodwill or social approval from the taker. Increasing the frequency of
business entertainment practices can thus engender a higher degree of social approval and build
up a higher degree of trust, thus making it more effective in generating stronger social sanctions
to facilitate business transactions (see Axelrod [1984] for the theory of social interaction and
social approval). Such a rationale also helps explain why most business entertainment activities
are practiced in a frequent and repeated pattern (see Yang, 1994), where the more frequently the
guest manager accepts business entertainment from the host manager, the stronger the obligation
she feels to reciprocate.
This argument can also be explained from both individual behavioral and social structural levels.
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First, at the individual behavioral level, repeated interactions like business entertainment can
renew an individual’s feelings of indebtedness to refresh a relationship for a long-term
orientation (see Bourdieu [1977] for a discussion on the role of social practices in renewal and
maintenance of relationships). In Chinese business settings, normally, an initial business
entertainment is between strangers where the host manager uses the event as a “foot-in-the-door”
strategy to get connected with the guest manager and sow the seeds of indebtedness in the
guest’s heart. Repeated entertainment activities can continue to refresh the guest manager’s
waning feelings of indebtedness and bring the guest manager closer to the host manager step by
step. The more frequently business entertainment is practiced, the closer and more stable and
long-term-oriented the business relationship becomes (see Wilmot, 1994).
Second, from a social structural perspective, frequent entertainment activities can also increase
the chances of exposing individual behaviors to group surveillance and make social sanctions
work more effectively (see Rawlins, 1994). An occasional entertainment between a host manager
and his or her guest may not be observable to others. However, when such activities are repeated
frequently, there will be a greater chance that others will see it. In the event the guest manager
defaults or fails to reciprocate the host manager, others would sanction the guest manager by
spreading bad reputation or refusing to deal with the manager in the future. Indeed, the mere
threat of such sanctions would usually deter the guest manager’s deviating behaviors and induce
the manager to comply with exchange terms. As such, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 2: The frequency of business entertainment practices is positively related
with its effectiveness.
5.1.3. Intimate business entertainment activities
Extending the above arguments further, I also propose that intimate business entertainment
activities are positively associated with the overall effectiveness of business entertainment
practice in facilitating transactional relationships.
Intimacy, which is denoted as the sentimental and physical closeness between individuals, is a
critical variable that has an impact on promoting reciprocal behavior and building long-term
interpersonal relationships (see Lowenthal & Haven, 1968). Some business entertainment
activities, such as drinking in a bar, singing at a KTV club, or having a sauna together, are
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effective means and venues for Chinese managers to use to develop intimacy with business
partners, so as to induce reciprocal behavior and to initiate, sustain, and reinforce long-term
orientations that can make social sanctions work more effectively in regulating transactions. I
define such entertainment activities as intimate entertainment.
As noted earlier, business entertainment can reinforce the power of social sanctions by inducing
an individual’s reciprocal behavior, which also promotes long-term orientation in relationship
building. In business settings, a host manager can choose to entertain a guest through intimate
business entertainment activities that can increase the intimacy between them, so that such
entertainment activities can trigger stronger reciprocal behavior and induce long-term orientation
from the guest manager. For instance, in leisure- and pleasure-based intimate business
entertainment, such as drinking in a bar, taking a sauna, or singing together in a KTV club, the
host manager can interact intimately with his or her guest, share secrets with the guest, and win
over the guest’s trust in a much easier manner (see Geiger & Turley, 2003; Hare, 1952; Mintz &
Du Bois, 2002). Repeating such events will build up a higher degree of intimacy and eventually
bring the guest manager closer to the host manager sentimentally (see Wilson, 1995).
Consequently, the higher degree of intimacy developed through those entertainment practices
will help to build a reciprocal long-term relationship between those managers so that social
sanctions become more effective in regulating their behaviors as well as the business transactions
between them (see Crosby, Evans & Cowles, 1990; Taylor, De Soto & Lieb, 1979). As such, I
propose that:
Hypothesis 3: Intimate entertainment activities have a positive relationship with the overall
effectiveness of business entertainment in reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate
transactional relationships.
5.1.4. Observable entertainment events
I argued earlier that, at the group level, business entertainment has the potential to enact group
dynamics to make social sanctions function more effectively. In business settings, a host
manager can choose to entertain a guest through activities that are observable to a broader range
of witnesses so that the guest manager’s individual behavior will be put under group surveillance.
In such occasions, business entertainment can strengthen the power of social sanctions to
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regulate individual behavior and govern transactions. I define this format of entertainment as
observable entertainment events and propose that they also have a positive relationship with the
overall effectiveness of entertainment practices in reinforcing the power of social sanctions to
facilitate transactional relationships.
There are three reasons supporting the above argument. First, in observable business
entertainment events, such as a formal banquet, a concert, and a golf game, certain established
routines are followed and formal dress codes are observed that all serve a ritual and ceremonial
purpose that can increase the commitment, dedication, loyalty, and allegiance between the guest
manager and the host manager and enhance their group orientation which translate into stronger
social sanctions (Gusfield & Michalowicz, 1984; Knottnerus, 2010).
Second, individuals often hold two sets of norms, one for intra-group members or insiders and
the other for inter-group members or outsiders, and uncertainty reduction and management and
control of deviant behaviors can happen only among insiders who share the same set of intragroup norms (see Merton, 1972). Observable entertainment events can turn strangers or outsiders
into acquaintances or insiders. At such events, the behaviors and activities of the participants are
observable to the general public, which not only strengthens the participants’ group identity but
also gives other observers the perception that they should be treated as being in the same group
(see Yang, 1994). This process helps to foster group orientation and eventually turns the host and
guest managers into insiders of the same group. As insiders of the same group, they will
internalize and abide by the intra-group norms of this group and their behaviors are under the
surveillance of all group members. In addition, these events give more opportunities for frequent
interactions and therefore provide more opportunity to establish a reciprocal long-term
relationship. These conditions are all conducive to the working of social sanctions.
Finally, the co-presence of business managers at observable entertainment events exposes
individual behaviors to other participants who have observed and experienced the same event, so
that misbehavior or default of the guest manager would be subjected to social sanctions of other
participants of the same event, or even from those who were not active in the focal event but
witnessed it. If a guest manager accepted entertainment but failed to reciprocate the host
manager, such a deviant behavior would be punished or perceived negatively by others who
observed the event. These observers could collectively spread the guest manager’s bad reputation
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around in the community and refuse to do business with him or her in the future. The more
people who have observed the event, the more likely that the manager’s deviant behavior and
bad reputation will be spread to a larger population. Deterrence through fear of such a
consequence will force the guest manager to abide by the norm of reciprocity and maintain a
business relationship with the host manager, which indicates stronger social sanctions. Hence, I
propose that:
Hypothesis 4: Observable entertainment events have a positive relationship with the overall
effectiveness of business entertainment in reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate
transactional relationships.
5.1.5. Moderating effects from the time factor -- stage of relationship
Time is a key factor in promoting reciprocal behavior and long-term and group orientation in
relationship building (Sharma & Patterson, 1987), conditions which in turn are critical to social
sanctions working more effectively (see Altman & Taylor, 1973). Knapp (1984) has classified
the time factor in a relationship into five stages, from early to late: initiating, experiencing,
intensifying, integrating, and bonding stages. In this study, I conceptualize the time factor in a
business relationship as either at early stage (i.e., initiating and experiencing) or at late stage (i.e.,
intensifying, integrating, and bonding). I propose that the positive association between the
amount of business entertainment spending and its effectiveness is stronger, whereas the
frequency of business entertainment practices and the intimacy-based and observability-oriented
business entertainment activities have diminishing effectiveness, in a late stage of relationship.

5.1.5.1. Stage of relationship’s moderating effects on amount and frequency
The stage of relationship determines the degree of familiarity between host and guest managers,
which can potentially moderate the relationship between business entertainment’s amount and
frequency and its effectiveness in boosting the power of social sanctions. In a later stage of
relationship, there are the possibilities that the host manager is familiar with his or her guest
manager, that they are close friends in non-business settings, that they are insiders of the same
social group who share common friends, that they interact with each other frequently both in
private life and during business transactions, et cetera. In all of those or similar circumstances,
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the host manager may have a net credit of favor over the guest manager in such forms as a
sunken direct investment in the relationship in the past. A longer duration of relationship means
the possibility of a higher amount of sunken direct investment in the guest manager from the host
manager. Accordingly, in the current business entertainment, even if the amount is low, a longer
duration of relationship would still compensate its effectiveness.
As for frequency, in a later stage of relationship at a higher degree of familiarity between host
and guest managers, frequent interactions on other occasions than business entertainment may
still serve the same purpose as that served by business entertainment. In such a case, the guest
manager may become less “sensitive” to business entertainment, and so increasing the frequency
of business entertainment practices may not generate the same level of social sanctions as it
could do in an earlier stage of relationship at a lower degree of familiarity. As such, I
hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 5a: The positive relationship between the dollar amount of entertainment
expenses and the effectiveness of business entertainment is stronger in a later stage of
relationship between the host and guest managers.
Hypothesis 5b: The positive effect that the frequency of entertainment practices has on
the effectiveness of business entertainment diminishes as the duration of relationship
between the host and guest managers increases.
5.1.5.2. Stage of relationship’s moderating effects on intimacy and observability
In this line of reasoning, it follows that the stage of relationship also has an important impact on
the effectiveness of intimate and observable business entertainment activities in reinforcing
social sanctions to facilitate transactions. An early stage of relationship features low-level
intimacy between host and guest managers. Therefore, intimacy-based entertainment activities
can help to break the emotional barriers and psychological guarding between them so that they
develop a higher degree of intimacy at a faster pace and greater scale (see Hays, 1985), which
indicates that intimacy-based business entertainment is more effective in reinforcing social
sanctions to facilitate transactions in an early stage of business relationship. When the
relationship enters its later stage, however, the increased degree of intimacy between the host and
guest managers makes it harder to keep the same pace and scale as before in promoting higher
degrees of intimacy. As such, intimacy-based business entertainment’s effectiveness should
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diminish along with the development of the business relationship.
Similarly, at the early stage, a higher degree of observability can put the guest manager’s
individual behaviors under broader group surveillance, which could help to initiate and intensify
this manager’s reciprocal behavior and long-term and group orientation. In contrast, at the late
stage of the relationship, observability’s impact gradually weakens. On the one hand, the focal
relationship is already well-publicized at this stage and more observability may not play its role
at the same level of effectiveness as in the early stage. On the other hand, at the later stage, the
relationship between the host and guest managers is more focused, therefore the network
pertinent to this focal relationship has actually shrunk (see Milardo, 1982). Accordingly,
observability-oriented business entertainment has weakened effectiveness in a later stage of
relationship. As such, I hypothesize that:
Hypothesis 6a: The positive effects of intimacy-based business entertainment are
weaker in a later stage of relationship.
Hypothesis 6b: The positive effects of observability-oriented business entertainment
diminish in a later stage of relationship.

5.2. Methods
5.2.1. Sample and data collection
The sampling frame. The data for this study were collected from companies affiliated with a
business association based in the northern Chinese city of Shijiazhuang. The association is a
nonprofit, nongovernmental club consisting of companies from both the private and the public
sectors. The functions of the association include, but are not limited to, facilitating business
information exchange among member firms, organizing social events among members, and
coordinating with the government for regulatory or other issues in which member firms are
involved. Senior government officials often serve as honorary presidents or sit on the council at
the association, which greatly increases its prestige.
There are three major considerations for sampling from corporate client sales managers at firms
affiliated with a business association based in a single Chinese city (i.e., Shijiazhuang). First, my
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analyses are built on the model of transaction governance structure (TGS), which holds that
business transactions are regulated through a combination of market, social, and legal sanctions
and that business entertainment reinforces social sanctions to compensate for the failure of
market sanctions, particularly under the conditions where market and legal infrastructures are
underdeveloped. Accordingly, the variation of the development level of market and legal
infrastructures at the society level determines the degree of dependence on social sanctions to
compensate for market imperfections and hence the effectiveness of business entertainment. For
instance, in cities with better developed market and legal systems, social sanctions and hence
business entertainment are less necessary or effective in regulating economic transactions. On
the other hand, in cities that are less developed, transaction governance relies mainly on social
sanctions that are often more effective. As such, framing my sample in a single city allows me to
control for all market and legal effects to ensure the reliability and accuracy of tests on business
entertainment’s effects on transactional relationships.
Second, the city of Shijiazhuang where data were collected (population of 450,000 at city core)
is located between coastal and inland China. It has experienced some degree of change in
China’s economic reform yet still keeps traditional Chinese social and economic features. This
characteristic offers a better setting for studying the effects of business entertainment, which is
widely practiced in the city. At the same time both market and legal sanctions are used quite
frequently in business transactions in the city, though they are not used as widely as in coastal
cities like Shanghai.
Finally, my focus on corporate client sales managers, whose targeted clients are mainly business
customers, provides perfect control for client type, which otherwise affects the relationship that I
investigate, simply because social sanctions (and hence business entertainment) are not equally
effective between transactions with business customers and individual consumers (see Crosby et
al., 1990; Stanton, 1981). For instance, selling to individual consumers usually adopts a pull
strategy where direct contact is not possible, therefore social sanctions play a less important role;
however, selling to business clients in face-to-fact contacts often takes a push strategy, where
social sanctions play a bigger role.
The procedures. At the time this survey was administered (May 2011), there were 327 active
(dues-paying) member firms at the association. Since the unit of analysis in this study is
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business-to-business transaction, I excluded from the sample retail stores targeting individual
consumers, company headquarters that did not have direct business operations, and firms that
mainly provided internal services. The final list contained 303 firms, which I contacted for an
interview. The secretaries of the association’s standing committee helped in the initial contact
that announced the purpose of the study, offered to provide a gift to the informant as a token of
appreciation for participation, and assured confidentiality and voluntary participation.
Specifically, these firms were asked to designate a sales representative of their key account as an
informant to cooperate in the survey, who upon completion of the survey would receive a gift
that had a market value of 50 Chinese yuan. It was repeatedly assured that the names of the
company and the participating individual as well as the survey event would be used only in
aggregated analyses and would never be disclosed to any third party.
The final sample. Two hundred and fifty-six out of a total of 303 firms (84%) agreed to
designate a sales representative to participate in the study, but 21 of them failed to do so, and it
was determined in later interview conversations that of the remaining participants, 16 were not in
fact sales personnel. Excluding these 37, the sample size for final analysis was 219. This
relatively high response rate was likely due to the sponsorship of the standing committee of the
business association, the gift incentive, and the facilitation by sales managers from a high-profile
local firm. The average age of the firms that those informants represented was 14.97 years (s.d. =
13.91), and their average size was 2025.88 employees (s.d. = 19341.20). They represented 18
industries and had a state ownership of 28.76 percent on average (s.d. = 37.64%).
The survey questionnaire. The questionnaire items for this study were designed, and the survey
conducted, in Chinese following Campbell and Fiske’s (1959) rules on self-reported data. In
order to generate data in compatible types for statistical analysis, most questions were structured
as seven-point Likert items. Industry sectors were classified into eighteen categories based on the
two-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC) scheme. To alleviate the potential concerns
about common method variance, I intentionally put items that measure the dependent variable
before independent variables and arranged all other items in a random order (e.g., Chang,
Witteloostuijn, & Eden, 2010, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). As shown in
Appendix B, the survey questionnaire contains 28 questions. Each informant was asked to
provide answers based on information about the client relationship of the key account he or she
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was handling. For privacy purposes, the respondents could disguise the names of their clients
with a code.
Before the formal survey, the questionnaire was tested in a focus group discussion with eight
local sales managers to make sure that the meaning of each question could be understood easily
and that the answers to the questions reflected what the questions were intended for. The focus
group discussion turned out to be very helpful for this study. For example, all eight managers
believed that basic information such as the firm name was too sensitive for the research topic
(e.g., entertainment activities are often viewed as corruption in general). Therefore, I removed
the item in the new version for fear that it might affect response rate (removing the item in fact
does not affect the results). Six out of the eight managers also suggested that governmental or
supervisor interruptions should have influences on business entertainment’s overall effectiveness.
Accordingly, I added relevant items in the revised version to create control variables for this
factor.
Information verification from the client side. Business entertainment involves both the giver
and the recipient. While interviewing sales managers garners information from the entertainment
giver’s side, it is also necessary to verify such information from the entertainment recipient’s side,
to make the story two-sided and therefore complete. To fulfill this purpose, during the survey
process, fifty randomly selected informants were asked to release the names of the focal clients,
to verify the survey information at the clients’ side. Thirty-nine out of those 50 informants agreed
to do so and 27 out of those 39 clients were willing to talk about the surveyed relationship. Most
of them agreed that the information on the completed survey questionnaire was close to reality.

5.2.2. The model
I used a vector of factors that capture the behavioral and social structural features of business
entertainment to test its effectiveness in reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate transactional
relationships. The model is specified as follows,
Y = α + β1X1 + β2X2 + ϵ
where Y captures the effectiveness of entertainment activities. On the right-hand side of the
equation, X1 is a vector of independent variables that measure the nature of entertainment
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activities, including amount, frequency, intimacy, and obervability; X2 is a vector of control
variables listed later; α is the intercept; β1 and β2 are vectors of estimated coefficients; and ϵ is
the error term.
The dependent variable is the effectiveness of business entertainment, i.e., whether business
entertainment can enhance the quality of a transactional relationship. I measured the quality of a
transactional relationship (i.e., effectiveness of business entertainment) with an index that is
constructed through the factor analysis method based on nine items included in the survey
questionnaire. These nine items cover the quality aspects of a transactional relationship regarding
the overall profitability; perceived overall smoothness of the transaction; loyalty of the client;
and disputes (which is the reverse of good quality) on the quality of supplies/services; timing of
payment/delivery; quantity of payment or delivery; change of order; change of delivery/payment
format; and after-sales service. Previous studies have used similar items to measure the quality of
business relationships (e.g., McMillan & Woodruff, 1999; Payne & Frow, 2005; Too, Souchon
& Thirkell, 2001). In addition, the quality of a transactional relationship is in fact a performance
issue. Therefore, the effectiveness or quality construct was also designed to capture the multidimensions of firm performance regarding market share, profit, and subjective assessment (see
Rowe & Morrow [1999] for a discussion about dimensionality of firm performance).
The overall profitability is measured by the item “how profitable the transaction with this client
is.” The overall smoothness of the transaction with a client is measured by responses to the item
“how smooth you feel the transaction is.” Client loyalty is measured by the item “how likely you
think the client would switch to a competitor.” All three items use the seven-point Likert scale.
The instructions for the other six items regarding the quality of supplies/services, timing of
payment/delivery, quantity of payment or delivery, change of order, change of delivery/payment
format, and after-sales service read: “Based on your knowledge about the business disputes
between your firm and this client, select the number from the following table that best describes
the case of each type of disputes. (‘1’ indicates there were many disputes, ‘7’ indicates no
dispute happened).” The Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient of this nine-item scale was .884,
which is above the frequently recommended value of .70 (e.g., Nunnally, 1978). (Please refer to
Appendix B for detail.).
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5.2.3. Independent variables
As hypothesized, I used the features of business entertainment to predict its effectiveness in
reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate transactional relationships. These predictors are specified
below.
Amount. The variable amount was measured by the amount of money spent on entertaining the
focal client in the previous fiscal year. Data were generated from respondents’ answers to the
survey question regarding how much they spent on entertainment with the focal client. I
expected this variable to carry a positive sign.
Frequency. The variable frequency was measured by data aggregated from respondents’ answers
to the question of how often they entertain a focal client in various forms. This variable was also
expected to bear a positive sign.
Intimacy. In hypothesis development, I defined the variable intimacy as the sentimental and
physical closeness between individuals. As a critical factor that affects reciprocal behavior and
long-term orientation in relationship building (see Lowenthal & Haven, 1968), intimacy can be
effectively promoted through such business entertainment activities as drinking in a bar, singing
in a KTV club, or having a sauna together. I measured the variable intimacy with responses on
questions regarding intimate entertainment activities including “bar/tea-house drinking”, “footcare, massage, sauna”, and “karaoke” (please refer to Appendix B “Question 25” for detail). I
predicted that this variable had a positive relationship with the effectiveness of business
entertainment.
Observability. As argued in developing the relevant hypothesis, observability is a key feature of
business entertainment, particularly in such entertainment activities as having a well-publicized
banquet in a big dining hall or in events that have other parties than the buyer and sellers
involved, which enables it to promote reciprocal behavior, enhance long-term orientation, and
enact group dynamics to boost the power of social sanctions to regulate individual behaviors. I
measured the variable observability with responses on questions regarding observable
entertainment activities including “formal banquets”, “golf and other sports”, “fishing and other
outdoor activities”, “travel and sightseeing”, and all events with “third-party participation”
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(please refer to Appendix B “Question 25” for detail). Again, I expected to find a positive sign
on this variable.
Interaction terms. Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b suggested the moderation effects from the time
factor on the quality of a relationship or the effectiveness of business entertainment in enhancing
a transactional relationship, and the time factor was conceptualized as the stage of a relationship.
I measured the moderator variable stage of relationship (i.e., duration) with responses from the
item “how long you have been doing business with the client,” with a shorter relationship
indicating an earlier stage and a longer relationship representing a later stage of transactional
relationship. Following a widely practiced procedure in generating interaction terms, I meancentered the moderator stage of relationship and the other variables that it was hypothesized to
moderate (i.e., amount, frequency, intimacy, and observability) before creating those four
interaction terms.

5.2.4. Control variables
On the basis of Hitt, Beamish, Jackson & Mathieu’s (2007) recommendation that multilevel
approaches can better address major real-world problems, I believed that including multilevel
factors in the analyses could provide a better explanation for the effectiveness of business
entertainment in facilitating transactional relationships. Hence, I controlled for industry-, firm-,
and transaction-level factors to isolate out the effects I had hypothesized, expecting that these
factors all would have an impact on the effectiveness of business entertainment in reinforcing
social sanctions to facilitate transactional relationships.
Industry controls. At the industry level, different products involve different ways of selling,
hence the effectiveness of business entertainment in facilitating transactions of different types of
products may vary. For instance, consumer goods are mainly distributed through retail channels,
and hence business entertainment is less effective in such transactions. On the contrary,
industrial products are often sold in face-to-face interactions, and hence business entertainment
might be more effective in facilitating such transactions. I controlled for general industry effects
by including 17 industry dummies representing 18 two-digit Standard Industry Classification
(SIC) sectors, using agricultural products (SIC 11) as the base industry.
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Firm attributes. Firm size and age were controlled for because those variables were found to
have effects on firm activities in previous studies (e.g., Peng & Luo, 2000). I believe these
variables can also affect the effectiveness of business entertainment. For instance, larger and
older firms may have set up larger social networks and accumulated richer social capital that
empower them to deal with business partners in a more favorable position, which should
strengthen the effectiveness when they entertain other clients. On the other hand, the
effectiveness should be mitigated when a comparatively smaller firm entertains a larger client. I
measured the size of both host and client firms by their total employees, and used the current
year less firm inception year as a proxy for the age of the host firm. Data for those variables were
collected with relevant survey items.
Transaction features. At the transaction level, as governmental regulators or supervisory
directives may interrupt with business transactions (which is a common problem faced by
Chinese businesses) and hence mitigate the effectiveness of business entertainment in a focal
transactional relationship, I controlled for these effects with responses to the item “how much
interference this client relationship gets from governmental administrators or supervisors.” I
expected this variable to carry a negative sign. In addition, as frequent human interactions can
generate stronger social approval (e.g., Axelrod, 1984), I also expected that the stage of a
transactional relationship and the frequency of business transactions might generate strong social
approval as well, which in turn would have positive effects on the effectiveness of business
entertainment. Hence, I controlled for those variables with measures generated from items “how
long you have been doing business with this client” and “how often you do business with this
client.” In addition, I also controlled for the perceived quality of the focal firm’s products,
assuming that products with better quality are easier to sell and that quality might have an impact
on the effectiveness of business entertainment. The measure for this variable was collected from
responses to the item “how you perceive your products’ quality relative to that of your major
competitors who also sell to this client.” Finally, the effectiveness of business entertainment in
reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate transactions is also determined by the geographic
distance of a client (i.e., local vs. long-distance trade), given the fact that social sanctions are not
equally effective in governing different types of transactions along that dimension (i.e., social
sanctions work more effectively in local communal settings rather than between long-distance
partners). Hence, I also controlled for such effects. The variable distance is measured with
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responses to the question about the client’s location ranging from within city (closest) to
overseas (the longest distance).

5.3. Results
The statistics of all variables and the correlation matrix are given in Table 5.1. The variance
inflation factors (VIFs) generated from ordinary least square (OLS) tests are well below the
critical value of 10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a concern in the dataset (e.g., the
largest VIF is 3.11). A test of skewness and kurtosis returned the values of 2.9 and 1.4,
respectively, indicating normal distribution in the dataset.
The results of the OLS regression analyses are reported in Table 5.2. In addition to industry
controls (which I will report later), I entered into Model 1 the other nine control variables (i.e.,
interruption, quality, stage, transaction frequency, client-size, host-size, host-age, and distance)
to capture the effects of firm and transaction level variables on the effectiveness of business
entertainment. As predicted, the control variables quality, transaction frequency, and host-size
carry positive coefficients that are significant at the 0.05 or even higher level; host age is
positively significant at the 0.10 level; and interruption and client-size both carry a negative sign
that is significant at the 0.05 level. The coefficients of stage and distance have the predicted
signs but are not significant.
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Table 5.1. Means, Standard Deviations & Correlationsª
Mean

S.D.

1

2

3

4

5

1. Effectiveness

5.78

1.15

2. Interruption

3.60

1.88

-.13*

3. Quality

5.13

1.22

.48***

-.07

4. Duration

4.46

4.29

.01

-.07

-.09

5. Transaction
frequency

4.45

1.56

.20**

.16**

.23***

.18**

6. Client size

1,740

9,057

-.10*

-.03

-.07

.47***

.12*

7. Host size

2,025

19,341

.05

.08

-.07

.01

-.06

.15**

8. Host age

14.97

13.91

.04

.08

-.08

.28***

.01

.21**

.00

9. Distance

1.93

1.39

.01

-.06

.07

.07

-.13*

.03

-.05

-.01

10. Amount

81

377

.11*

-.07

-.03

.22**

.22***

.22***

.09

.04

.13*

11. Frequency

55.41

269.40

.14**

-.07

-.08

.17*

.17**

.25***

.07

.01

.08

.69***

12. Intimacy

30.27

118.14

.14**

-.03

-.09

.19**

.10

.32***

.09

-.02

.07

.43***

.67***

13. Observability

11.21

70.84

.05

-.11*

-.11*

.20**

.11*

.53***

-.03

-.00

.03

.47***

.55***

1. ªn = 219.
2. * P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 (2 tailed p-value)
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6

7

8

9

10

11

12

.43***

Table 5.2. Results of Regression Analyses of Effectiveness of Business Entertainmentª
Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

-.19*
(.07)

-.17*
(.07)

-.16*
(.07)

-.17*
(.07)

-.15*
(.07)

-.14*
(.07)

.88***
(.11)

.89***
(.12)

.92***
(.11)

.94***
(.11)

.96***
(.11)

.95***
(.11)

Duration

.03
(.03)

.03
(.03)

.03
(.04)

.02
(.03)

.04
(.03)

.06
(.04)

Transaction frequency

.20*
(.09)

.16
(.09)

.15
(.09)

.15
(.09)

.16
(.09)

.15
(.09)

Client size

-4.03E – 5*
(.00)

-4.40E – 5*
(.00)

-4.99E – 5**
(.00)

-5.78E – 5**
(.00)

-7.91E – 5***
(.00)

-4.83E – 5†
(.00)

Host size

1.48E – 5*
(.00)

1.36E – 5†
(.00)

1.37E – 5†
(.00)

1.33E – 5†
(.00)

1.61E – 5*
(.00)

1.64E – 5*
(.00)

Host age

.02†
(.01)

.02†
(.01)

.02†
(.01)

.02*
(.01)

.02
(.01)

.03*
(.01)

Distance

-.01
(.10)

-.04
(.08)

-.04
(.10)

-.04
(.10)

-.04
(.09)

-.06
(.10)

.15†
(.08)

-.04
(.11)

-.02
(.11)

-.06
(.11)

-.09
(.12)

.35*
(.13)

.15†
(.16)

.05
(.16)

-.05
(.19)

.37*
(.16)

.38*
(.17)

.40*
(.17)

.01*
(.00)

.02*
(.01)

Control variables
Interruption
Quality

Industry controls (see Table 5.3)
Independent variables
Amount
Frequency
Intimacy
Observability
Interactions
7.62E – 7*
(.00)

Amount x duration

-.00
(.00)

Frequency x duration

-5.17E - 5
(.00)

Intimacy x duration

-.01*
(.00)

Observability x duration

1. a n = 219
2. † P < .10; * P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 (two tailed p-value).
3. Enclosed in parentheses are standard errors.

In Model 2, I added the variable amount to capture its influence on the effectiveness of business
entertainment. As expected, the variable carries a positive sign that is significant at the 0.10 level.
This result lends support for Hypothesis 1, which predicted that the amount spent on business
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entertainment is positively associated with its effectiveness in enhancing the quality of
transactional relationships. But surprisingly, when more predictors were added into the model,
the significant effect disappeared. I have two explanations for this situation. First, the empirical
test was designed to test the overall effectiveness of business entertainment in enhancing each
pair of client relationships with a yearly cumulative amount of entertainment spending on each
particular client. The test is not able to examine the effects of spending in each event on each
particular sale. Failing to reduce analysis to the level of each particular event and sale may have
caused this inconsistency. Second, when other factors are involved, the intensity of
entertainment spending, like dollar amount and frequency, may not be the major factors in
enhancing relationship quality. For instance, an old Chinese saying goes that “the gift sent from
afar, as light as a goose feather, conveys deep affections,” which indicates that other factors can
outweigh the intensity of spending in improving relationships. Future studies can design
different models to test the effects of individual entertainment events on individual sales.
Model 3 also takes the variable frequency into consideration to predict its impact on the
effectiveness of business entertainment. The variable bears a positive coefficient that is
significant at the 0.05 level. The finding confirms Hypothesis 2, where I predicted that the
frequency of business entertainment practice is positively associated with its effectiveness. As in
Model 2, again, when more predictors were added into the model, the measure becomes
insignificant. Because frequency, like dollar amount, is also an indicator of the intensity of
entertainment practices, I have a similar speculation as that for dollar amount in explaining this
empirical inconsistency.
In Model 4, the variable intimacy was added to predict its impact on the effectiveness of business
entertainment. The variable returns a positive coefficient that is significant at the 0.05 level. The
finding renders support to Hypothesis 3, where I predicted that the intimacy of business
entertainment practice is positively associated with its effectiveness.
Model 5 further tests the impact of observability on the effectiveness of business entertainment.
The returned coefficient is positively significant at the 0.05 level. The finding supports
Hypothesis 4, which suggested that the more observable business entertainment practices are, the
more effective they are in reinforcing social sanctions to facilitate transactions.
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Model 6 is the full analysis that also considers the moderating role of the time factor, i.e., the
stage of relationship, in the associations between the effectiveness of business entertainment and
the predictors amount, frequency, intimacy, and observability. The stage of relationship’s
moderation effect on amount is positively significant at the .05 level, indicating that the stage of
relationship strengthens the association between amount and the effectiveness of business
entertainment. Such a result supports Hypothesis 5a, which predicted that the impact from
amount on the effectiveness of business entertainment increases in the later stage of a
transactional relationship. In addition, the results also show that the interaction term between
stage of relationship and observability carries a positive coefficient that is significant at the 0.05
level, supporting Hypothesis 6b, which predicted that the impact of observability on the
effectiveness of business entertainment diminishes in the later stage of a transactional
relationship. Hypothesis 5b and 6a also predicted diminishing effects of frequency and intimacy
on the effectiveness of business entertainment in a later stage of relationship. Nonetheless, the
results are negative as predicted but not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 5b and Hypothesis 6a
are not supported. In line with Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 6a, and 6b, following the procedures suggested
by Cohen, Cohen, West, and Aiken (2003), I plotted these interactions at conditional values of
stage of relationship (one standard deviation [1 s.d.] above and below the mean). As illustrated
in Figure 5.1 (a) and (d), the association between amount, observability, and effectiveness is
stronger in a later rather than earlier stage of relationship; and such a pattern is not significant
between frequency, intimacy, and effectiveness, which is apparent in Figure 5.1 (b) and (c).
The results of all industry dummies are reported in Table 5.3. When the model covers only
industry dummies (Column 1), it has an R-Square of .11 that is not significant, indicating that
there is no obvious industry effect on the effectiveness of business entertainment. In fact,
industry controls in most of the models are not significant. In the full model that covers all
independent and control variables (Column 7), the R-Square is .38 (p < .001), which indicates
consistent model fit.
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(a) Interaction with Amount

(b) Interaction with Frequency

(c) Interaction with Intimacy

(d) Interaction with Observability

Figure 5.1: Simple Slopes of Stage of Relationship’s Moderation Effects
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Table 5.3. Results of Regression Analyses of Industry Control
Industry
control

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

Model 6

Independent and other control variables (see Table 5.2)
Mining

.36
(1.40)

-.68
(1.24)

-.81
(1.24)

-.63
(1.23)

-.58
(1.42)

-.58
(1.43)

-.93
(1.44)

Utilities

-.23*
(1.23)

-2.18*
(1.07)

-2.17*
(1.07)

-2.04*
(1.06)

-3.21*
(1.23)

-3.18*
(1.23)

-3.40**
(1.24)

Construction

.01
(.92)

-.79
(.81)

-.85
(.82)

-.74
(.80)

-1.01
(.90)

-.96
(.91)

-.99
(.93)

Manufacturing

.14
(.92)

-.70
(.82)

-.68
(.81)

-.64
(.80)

-.31
(.88)

-.28
(.88)

-.37
(.88)

Wholesale

-.61
(.91)

-1.00
(.79)

-1.02
(.79)

-.95
(.78)

-1.29
(.85)

-1.27
(.86)

-1.38
(.84)

Retail

-.49
(.91)

-.77
(.79)

-.75
(.78)

-.69
(.77)

-1.07
(.95)

-1.02
(.96)

-1.19
(.98)

Transportation

1.64
(1.23)

.95
(1.07)

.95
(1.07)

1.26
(1.06)

1.21
(2.16)

1.23
(2.18)

.76
(2.14)

Information

.79
(1.40)

-.51
(1.22)

-.64
(1.23)

-.61
(1.20)

-.63
(1.24)

-.61
(1.24)

-.63
(1.23)

Finance

-1.14
(1.00)

-1.53*
(.87)

-1.53*
(.86)

-1.33*
(.86)

-1.34
(1.05)

-1.28
(1.06)

-1.47
(1.10)

Real estate

1.25
(1.54)

-.04
(1.36)

-.05
(1.37)

-.24
(1.35)

-1.95
(2.21)

-1.90
(2.22)

-1.65
(2.55)

Professionals

-1.18
(.96)

-.56
(.84)

-.66
(.84)

-.63
(1.83)

-.88
(.90)

-.87
(.90)

-.90
(.92)

Administration

.01
(1.80)

-1.11
(1.57)

-1.15
(1.56)

-1.24
(1.54)

-1.20
(1.57)

-1.18
(1.57)

-1.49
(1.56)

Education

.81
(1.80)

-.32
(1.60)

-.42
(1.60)

-.38
(1.58)

.22
(1.63)

.17
(1.64)

.66
(1.62)

Health care

– 1.15
(1.06)

-1.49
(.92)

-1.54
(.92)

-1.70
(.91)

-1.64
(1.01)

-1.67
(1.01)

-1.87
(1.01)

Recreation

-2.21
(1.54)

– 2.84*
(1.36)

– 2.81*
(1.36)

– 2.62*
(1.34)

– 2.51*
(1.38)

-2.48
(1.38)

-2.61
(1.36)

Food services

.79
(.98)

.12
(.86)

.02
(.87)

-.03
(.85)

-1.67
(1.07)

– 1.72
(1.08)

– 1.71
(1.07)

Public services

-.93
(1.06)

-1.37
(.95)

-1.40
(.96)

-1.22
(.94)

-.23
(1.10)

-.14
(1.13)

.06
(1.12)

.11

.29***

.30***

.33***

.35***

.36***

.38***

1.46 (17, 201)

11.16 (8. 210)

10.36 (1, 209)

10.23 (1, 208)

9.94 (1, 207)

9.60 (1, 206)

7.77 (4, 202)

.11

.18**

.01†

.03*

.02*

.01*

.02

Total R2
F (df)
∆ R2

1. an = 219
2. † P < .10; * P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001 (two tailed p-value).
3. Enclosed in parentheses are standard errors.
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5.4. Summary
In this chapter, I developed a group of hypotheses to test the effects of the social and behavioral
features of business entertainment on its effectiveness in reinforcing social sanctions to enhance
transactional relationships. Particularly, I used the features of business entertainment including
the amount spent on entertainment activities, the frequency, intimacy, and observability of
entertainment practices to predict its effectiveness. Empirical tests were conducted on a sample
of sales managers recruited from firms affiliated with a business association based in a northern
Chinese city. The results indicate that the effectiveness of business entertainment is significantly
related to the amount spent, plus the frequency, intimacy, and observability of entertainment
practices. In addition, the association between amount and effectiveness strengthens in a later
stage of relationship, while that between observability and effectiveness weakens in a later stage
of relationship. These results provide additional evidence supporting my transaction governance
approach to business entertainment.
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Chapter 6
6. Conclusion
In this dissertation, I take a governance approach to examine the role of business entertainment
in reinforcing the power of social sanctions to facilitate economic transactions. My basic premise
is that each society, depending on its cultural and historical heritages, uses a unique transaction
governance structure (TGS) that combines social, market, and legal sanctions to regulate the
behaviors of economic agents. I further argue that business entertainment reinforces the role of
social sanctions in regulating economic transactions, particularly under the conditions where
market and legal infrastructures are less developed. In cases where social sanctions play a greater
governance role, firms will spend more on business entertainment and such entertaining
activities will also be more effective in facilitating transactional relationships.
To verify the pervasiveness of business entertainment under different conditions of social,
market, and legal sanctions, I ran empirical tests on a sample of manufacturers listed on the
Shanghai Stock Exchange in China. The results indicate that firms spend more on entertainment
when they are operating under the conditions where market and legal infrastructures are less
developed and where social sanctions play a bigger role in governing business relationships.
These findings confirm the transaction governance account for business entertainment.
To predict business entertainment’s effectiveness in facilitating exchange relationships, I
conducted empirical tests on survey data collected from a sample of Chinese sales managers. The
results suggest that the social, behavioral, and economic features of business entertainment,
including the dollar amount, frequency, intimacy, and observability, all have an impact on its
effectiveness in reinforcing the power of social sanctions to facilitate exchange relationships.
Such findings further support my governance approach to business entertainment.
This dissertation bridges a major literature gap between economics and social studies regarding
business entertainment. Despite the prevalence of business entertainment in economic life, most
studies investigated the phenomenon with a social rather than an economic approach. Meanwhile,
despite economists’ recognition of the role of social sanctions in regulating economic activities,
few studies have examined the relationship between entertainment activities and social sanctions
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in business settings. My dissertation bridges the gap by arguing that the social practice of
business entertainment plays a role in economic transaction governance by reinforcing social
sanctions to supplement market sanctions in regulating exchange relationships.
This dissertation also answers the questions I raised earlier regarding whether or not business
entertainment plays a positive role, how it plays such a role, why the pervasiveness of business
entertainment varies across societies, and how to make it more effective in facilitating
transactional relationships. Particularly, I have established that business entertainment plays a
positive role in economic life through reinforcing the power of social sanctions to regulate
individual behaviors in economic transactions. In addition, the pervasiveness of business
entertainment across societies depends on the degree of reliance on social sanctions to
supplement market sanctions in different societies; and its effectiveness in playing that role
depends on its social and behavioral features.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study that provides a systematic explanation for
business entertainment from a transaction governance perspective. As summarized below in this
chapter, the theoretical arguments and empirical findings of this dissertation make important
contributions to the management literature. They also contribute to organizational economics in
general. Business practitioners and policy makers can all draw practical implications from this
study. Before concluding this dissertation, I also point out its limitations that provide directions
for future research to pursue.

6.1. Contributions
Business entertainment is a popular practice that is observable in business settings all over the
world, though the degree of its pervasiveness varies across societies. While business
entertainment is often simply condemned as corruption and a social vice, I believe that social
practices such as business entertainment, if adopted by a population collectively, must have
underlying reasons for their existence. This dissertation has identified those underlying social
and behavioral roots of business entertainment and explored the working mechanisms through
which business entertainment’s positive role in economic life is executed. In fulfilling that
purpose, this dissertation makes three major contributions.
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The foremost contribution of this dissertation is that it provides a transaction governance
explanation for business entertainment with a multidisciplinary approach. It has systematically
identified a positive economic role for the social practice of entertainment in business settings
and helps people to understand this commonly practiced and widely observed but understudied
and often misinterpreted business practice from an economic perspective. In general, it has
confirmed the economic meaning of a social activity and contributed to the literature by setting
up an example of rigorous “economic analysis of social interactions” with a coherent theoretical
framework and well-crafted empirical tests (see Manski, 2000).
In addition to the above-mentioned theoretical contribution, this dissertation’s unique approach
in framing the integrated business entertainment construct and designing its measures also
enables future research to use a similar construct and measures to investigate various topics in
the management literature along an alternative route. Such topics include business ethics, guanxi
(i.e., social connections) studies, organizational studies (i.e., studies on bribery), social capital,
and (relational) marketing, et cetera. The approach is considered new because it differs from the
previous studies in three aspects. First, instead of focusing on either the business entertainment
giver’s or taker’s side, it views business entertainment giving and taking as an integrated
interactive process (Hodgson, 1992) embedded in social relations (Zelizer, 1998). Second,
instead of assuming that there are clear ways to distinguish which entertainment activities are
bribes and which are gifts, it treats business entertainment as an integrated construct based on the
understanding that defining business entertainment as either bribe or gift is relative to cultural
and other contexts (e.g., Noonan, 1986; Philips, 1984; Salbu, 1997). Third, rather than focusing
solely on public officials as entertainment takers, it denotes business entertainment takers as all
economic transactors in business settings, including both private agents (e.g., Dunfee et al.,
1999), principals (Fort & Noone, 2000), and any ordinary person (Smart, 1993). This new
approach allows researchers to focus on the functions rather than the nature of social practices
like business entertainment and to use it as a measure to operationalize the aforementioned
studies. Take the research on social capital as an example. The process where business
entertainment reinforces the power of social sanctions is in fact a process where social capital is
created. While my study has identified the conditions where business entertainment is more
effective in reinforcing the power of social sanctions, future research could take a similar
approach to verify how to create social capital more efficiently.
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Finally, the TGS model in this study also contributes to organizational economics by expanding
the field and helping to generalize a number of theories across different institutional contexts.
One of those is the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE). The traditional TCE theory was
framed along the market-contract-hierarchy continuum where hierarchy is conceptualized as a
special form of legal sanctions. Although the later, modified versions of TCE recognized social
sanctions as another nonmarket institution that could compensate for market imperfections along
with legal sanctions, the role of social sanctions has never been clearly carved out as an
independent pillar upholding transaction governance. My TGS model explicitly split out the
social dimension from nonmarket institutions and provided a full story of transaction governance.
On this TGS platform, the relative power of the three governance devices can now be clearly
understood. Also, given the relativity of TGS, the three elements are not used equally across
societies, firms, or even products. As such, we now can better understand variations in
transaction governance that puzzle scholars. For instance, TCE’s focus on the choice of
governance mechanisms based on relative costs makes its interpretation of economic
organization in East Asia less accurate (e.g., Dyer, 1997; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988), where
higher asset specificity does not necessarily raise transaction costs. My emphasis on the relative
availability and effectiveness of social, market, and legal sanctions as antecedents of the choice
of transaction governance mechanisms based on costs offers a theoretical explanation for the
empirical discrepancies of TCE-based studies.

6.2. Managerial Implications
The theory I presented and the effects I found in this dissertation can help business practitioners
to properly use entertainment as a marketing tool and to manage entertainment expenses more
effectively. In April 2004, U.S. telecom equipment manufacturer Lucent Technologies fired four
executives at its China unit on entertainment-related “bribery” allegations (The New York Times,
2004). In late 2008, Avon Products Inc., the world’s largest direct seller of cosmetics, began to
investigate its China operations over allegations of certain “improper” entertainment expenses
(Reuters, 2008). Frequent reports of such issues among internationally prominent firms signify
the importance and meaningfulness of my arguments and findings to business practitioners. First,
based on my theory that business entertainment plays a positive role by reinforcing social
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sanctions to facilitate transactions, business practitioners should re-examine their policies on the
practice of business entertainment. They should face the phenomenon with a realistic attitude
based on a profound understanding of its underlying mechanisms, instead of merely applying
superficial treatments such as banning entertainment practices in dealing with clients. Second,
following my argument that the pervasiveness of business entertainment depends on the
relativity of TGS, international business practitioners should adjust business entertainment
policies to adapt to the TGS of each national market or even within different industries. Business
entertainment practices that are considered illegal at home but are permitted in host nations can
be used as a powerful tool to facilitate transactions. In emerging market ventures, for instance,
business practitioners should take a more lenient approach toward entertainment practices to
cope with the institutional environment where social sanctions play a bigger role in transaction
governance. Third, based on my theory and empirical findings that the economic and social
behavioral features of business entertainment (i.e., dollar amount, frequency, intimacy, and
observability) determine its effectiveness in facilitating transactional relationships, managers
could make better decisions regarding where to use business entertainment and how to manage
entertainment expenses more efficiently in dealing with clients.

6.3. Implications for Policy Makers
My study is meaningful for public policy makers as well. For societies with a prevailing rationallegal system, legislators should consider variations in TGS across countries. Some scholars have
argued that the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, for instance, has been a serious
hindrance that hurts the competitiveness of U.S. companies in foreign countries (Hines, 1995),
especially in those emerging markets featuring a social sanctions–dominated TGS. My research
suggests that the governments in developed countries (such as the United States) should design
more feasible international business policies rather than merely bringing firms into legal
procedures.

Likewise, the governments in emerging markets, especially in such collectivist societies as China,
must recognize the evolutionary nature of TGS and the interaction effects among social, market,
and legal sanctions. They must realize that a social sanctions–dominated TGS reinforced by
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business entertainment is transitional in nature. They should invest in market and legal
infrastructures—to gradually weaken social sanctions’ dominant role, on the one hand, and to
restrain market forces during the transition for societal good, on the other hand—to cope with
rapid industrialization and urbanization (see Orts, 2001; Potter, 2002).

6.4. Limitations
This study is the first to examine business entertainment from a transaction governance
perspective. Inevitably, it cannot offer an exhaustive account, and the limitations of this study
point out promising directions for future scholars to further our understanding of entertainment
in business settings. There are five limitations in this study.
First, as noted earlier in delineating this study’s boundaries, this study considers social sanctions
that are secular in nature, and does not cover religious sanctions, which are also a very important
form of social sanctions that can potentially govern the behaviors of economic agents. It would
be interesting to see how religions play in the role of transaction governance and as a result affect
the prevalence and effectiveness of business entertainment.
Second, my empirical test on the pervasiveness of business entertainment is conducted with data
collected from different regions in a single country on a single industry sector (i.e., Chinese
manufacturers). I am not sure of the generalizability of my research. In the meanwhile, my
method may have caused some of the measures to be insignificant or even contrary to my
expectations. For example, the control variable firm size has an insignificant result in my test of
business entertainment’s pervasiveness. While firm size in many studies is measured by the total
employees of a firm, the workforce on the shop floor of manufacturers may not properly capture
the size effect for the purpose of my study, because using entertainment to facilitate business
transactions is basically a marketing and sales issue. Future studies can extend the test to other
industry sectors and compare firms across different countries (e.g., between Japan and the U.S.)
following my approach.
Third, unknown exogenous variables and uncontrolled potential mediators may affect the
relationships I have studied in the pervasiveness test. For example, entertainment activities have
the potential to create social capital that accumulates over time. It is possible that the
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pervasiveness of a firm’s use of business entertainment diminishes while the effectiveness of
entertainment (even if in reduced scale) in facilitating transactions increases over time because
social capital takes incremental effects. My model can’t fully capture such variance. Future
studies can explore these issues.
Fourth, because of the limitations of second-hand data, I tested the pervasiveness determinants of
business entertainment at society level without controlling for or digging into the individual level,
which may also contain factors that can potentially affect the relationship I have studied. For
example, at the individual level, the heterogeneity of human and social capital possession among
firms’ board members can influence firm outcomes (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella,
2008) and hence may cause the use of entertainment to vary across firms. This is one promising
topic for future studies to explore.
Finally, in collecting data for empirically testing the effectiveness of business entertainment in
facilitating transactional relationships, some of the informants emphasized that entertainment
activities were indeed a two-way back-and-forth, rather than a one-way, process: the buyer also
treated the seller back upon receipt of entertainment from the seller. My one-way-based
empirical design was unable to account for the contributions to the quality of a dyadic
transactional relationship made by the back-ward entertainment from the buyer to the seller. This
point might be a good topic for future research to address.

6.5. Conclusion
Having completed a critique on current literatures on business entertainment, transaction
governance, and social sanctions, I set up the theoretical framework of this dissertation by
summarizing transaction governance mechanisms into the TGS model and proposing the
relativity of TGS across societies. I then drew on theories from various disciplines to theorize on
how business entertainment plays its governance role in reinforcing social sanctions to regulate
transactions. I further conducted empirical analyses to predict the pervasiveness and
effectiveness of business entertainment across firms and between transactions, respectively, with
two sets of hypotheses and data. In so doing, I mapped business entertainment onto the TGS
framework to build an integrated model and carved out a positive (i.e., governance) role for
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business entertainment to play in economic life.
My study provides preliminary evidence on the role of business entertainment in facilitating
market transactions and, hence, explains that the pervasiveness of entertainment activities among
firms depends on their institutional environments. In particular, I found that my measure of
entertainment pervasiveness is significantly related to factors that shape different transaction
governance structures at the institutional level. I also found that the effectiveness of business
entertainment is significantly related to the dollar amount, frequency, intimacy, and observability
of entertainment practices. In addition, the association between amount and effectiveness
strengthens in a later stage of relationship, while that between observability and effectiveness
weakens in a later stage of relationship. These results provide additional evidence supporting my
transaction governance approach to business entertainment.
This is the first study that examines business entertainment from a transaction governance
perspective. By challenging the prevailing (and often negative) views on business entertainment,
my conceptual arguments and empirical findings contribute to literatures in management,
sociology, and economics and offer new and useful guidelines for business practitioners and
policy makers to deal with entertainment-related issues in business settings.
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Appendix A. An Excerpt on Entertainment Expenses (EE)
Article 6: Entertainment Expenses (EE).
a. The Company would host ONE formal banquet for visiting clients. The rest of the meals
for them should be standard working meals.
b. The budget for banquets is as follows: For a formal banquet hosted by a general manager,
the standard is 50 yuan per person/time; for those hosted by a division manager, the limit is
30 yuan per person/time; for banquets hosted by other employees, the budget is 20 yuan
per person/time.
c. Budget limit for regular working meals is 20 yuan per person/day.
d. The Company can give gifts and gift money to important clients; but the general manager’s
authorization regarding the type and value of gift must be sought for in advance.
e. Entertainment activities can be arranged for important clients; yet these activities should be
restricted to ONCE per client per visiting time. The budget for karaoke is 100 yuan per
person/time; for saunas, 150 yuan per person/time.
f. The Company provides meals for home–coming sales personnel and other employees on
holiday duties at the budget of 15 yuan per person/time. Under circumstances when a
formal banquet is necessary, the budget should be controlled at the level of not more than
40 yuan per person/time.

Source: Company Website. Company name is not disclosed here for privacy concerns.
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Appendix B. Survey Questionnaire
SURVEY QUESTIONS ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
ENTERTAINMENT IN FACILITATING BUSINESS RELATIONSHIPS
This survey is part of a private research on the role of business entertainment in facilitating
transactional relationships. It is NOT related to any governmental investigations. All information
obtained through this survey is strictly confidential, and I will not reveal any of your personal or
firm information to any other third party. Please also refer to the attached information letter for
further explanation on privacy issues. This survey consists of 28 questions. I highly appreciate
your truthful and detailed answers.
SECTION I: INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR FIRM
1. Your firm was first founded in ___________.
2. There are _________ full time employees in your firm.
3. The percentage of state ownership in your firm is _______%.

SECTION II: QUESTIONS ON CLIENT AND BUSINESS ENTERTAINMENT
The following section includes 25 questions. Please identify one of the important clients of your
firm and answer these questions based on your information on the client and its relationship with
your firm. For privacy purpose, you may prefer to disguise the client’s name with a code.
1. Client code ______
2. How far away is this client located?
a. Within City;

d. In neighboring province;

b. In a neighboring city of the same

e. In other provinces;

province/Municipality

f. In Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macao;

c. In other cities of the same

g.

In other overseas areas.

Province/Municipality;
3. How many employees does this client have? ______________
4. What percentage of this client firm’s shares is owned by the State? ___________%
5. What percentage does this client’s business count in your total annual sales? ______%
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6. What’s the main line of business your firm is involved with this client? Please circle the major
one.
1. Agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting (11) ;

10. Finance and insurance (52);

2. Mining (21);

11. Real estate, and rental and leasing (53);

3. Utilities (22);

12. Professional, scientific, and technical services (54);

4. Construction (23);

13. Management and administrative services (55-56);

5. Manufacturing (31-33);

14. Educational services (61);

6. Wholesale trade (42);

15. Health care and social assistance (62);

7. Retail trade (44-45);

16. Arts, entertainment, and recreation (71);

8. Transportation and warehousing (48-49);

17. Accommodation and food services (72);

9. Information (51);

18. Public administration (92).

7. How do you compare the quality of your firm’s products/services that are being sold to this
client firm to that of your competitors who also sell similar products/services to this client?
(“1” indicates better, “7” indicates worse)
Better

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

worse

8. How much negative interference does this client relationship get from governmental
administrators or supervisors? (“1” indicates none, “7” indicates a lot)
None

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

A lot

9. How frequently do managers from your firm and this client interact with each other in other
private occasions than business?
(“1” indicates very rarely, “7” indicates very often)
Very rarely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very often

10. How often have you been doing business with this client? (“1” indicates one shot, “7”
indicates daily supplies)
One shot

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Daily supply

11. How long have you been doing business with this client? (“1” indicates started recently, “7”
indicates very long time)
Started recently

1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Very long time

12. Based on your knowledge about the business disputes between your firm and this client,
select the number from the following table that best describes the case of each type of
disputes. (“1” indicates many disputes, “7” indicates nothing happened)
Quality issues

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Time of delivery/payment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Quantity of products or
amount of payment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change of order

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change of delivery or
payment method

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

After-sales service

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

13. Has this client ever threatened to terminate the transactions with your firm? (“1” indicates
never, “7” indicates very frequently)
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very frequently

14. Has this client ever threatened to file a lawsuit against your firm? (“1” indicates never, “7”
indicates very frequently)
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very frequently

15. Did this client actually sue your firm in a court? (“1” indicates never, “7” indicates very
frequently)
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very frequently

16. Did this client solve disputes with your firm through mediators? (“1” indicates never, “7”
indicates very frequently)
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very frequently

17. Did this client communicate with your firm privately on disputes? (“1” indicates never, “7”
indicates very frequently)
Never

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

very frequently

18. How smooth do you feel the transactions were with this client? (“1” indicates lots of disputes,
“7” indicates very smooth)
Lots of disputes 1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Very smooth

19. What is your firm’s overall profitability over this client? (“1” indicates huge loss, “7”
indicates very lucrative)
Huge loss

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very lucrative

20. How is the competition in the business with this client? (“1” indicates no competition, “7”
indicates many competitors)
No competition

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 many competitors

21. All else held equal, do you think your competitors have a better or worse situation on the
following issues, comparing to that of your firm? (“1” indicates better, “7” indicates worse)
Quality issues

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Time of delivery/payment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Quantity of products or
amount of payment

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change of order

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Change of delivery or
payment method

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

After-sales service

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

22. All else being equal, how likely do you think this client may switch to your competitors? (“1”
indicates not likely, “7” indicates very likely)
Not likely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very likely

23. If your competitors have a better position, how likely do you think this client may switch to
your competitors? (“1” indicates not likely, “7” indicates very likely)
Not likely

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very likely

24. Overall, what’s the likeliness of losing this client? (“1” indicates not likely, “7” indicates
very likely)
Not likely

1

2

3

4
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5

6

7

Very likely

25. Please fill in the following form based on your knowledge about the entertainment activities
between your firm and this client during last year.
Seller & Buyer Participation Only
Times

Expenses

Decision-maker
Participation Times

Formal banquet
Bar/tea-house
drinking
Golf and other
sports
Karaoke
Fishing and
other outdoor
activities
Travel and
sightseeing
Foot-care,
massage, sauna
Other activities
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Third-Party Participation
Times

Expenses

Decision-maker
Participation Times
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